dougnoll’s posthaven

Segment 1: Rafia Zakaria.  On this edition of The Doug Noll Show we’re speaking with attorney, author and human rights advocate Rafia Zakaria. Rafia is a regular columnist for a number of publications and also serves on the Board of Amnesty International USA as the first Pakistani American woman ever to do so. 

Rafia is originally from Karachi, Pakistan, which is one of the world’s largest cities. She came to the U.S. in the late 1990’s to attend college, then law school, and ultimately did graduate work in political philosophy. Her journey was unusual in the sense that half of her life was spent in Pakistan and the other half has been in the United States. Rafia has a sense of dual consciousness having lived in two societies. She never thought her country of origin would be at war with the country in which she now lives.

Pakistan has many different ethic groups. When Rafia speaks about Pakistan to an American audience she always emphasizes its geographical location. It’s a small country encroached by big countries. To understand Pakistan’s national psyche, you have to remember that they have a hostile India on one border, Iran on another side, a third border with China, and then another border with US NATO forces. As a country, Pakistan feels threatened, which is very much felt as a child growing up there. There’s a constant shadow of war.

Segment 2: The Partition of India.  Pakistan has clearly suffered at the hands of European Imperialism. The demarcation of the border between Pakistan and India has played a huge role in their history. The Partition of India was the largest movement of humans in modern history. Millions of people moved, there were many deaths and lost families. The people who came to Pakistan had lived in their own communities for centuries. They had no reference point for what migration would feel like and how to set up new communities. On the other hand, the Pakistani people found themselves surrounded by strangers from another country. In many ways Partition defines Pakistan’s current issues and discord. 

Segment 3: Culture and Religion are Intermingled.  Pakistan’s culture and religion are intermingled as well as heavily patriarchal, which has been a constant cause of strife. The challenge that Pakistani women face is to discern what is “cultural” and what is “religious.” Women’s perspectives were often left out of religious texts, but change in this respect is often met with tremendous opposition.

Segment 4: Two Power Contenders.  The schism between Shia and Sunni doctrine is becoming a focal point in terms of politics and violence. There are two power contenders in the Middle East: Saudi Arabia and Iran. Rafia grew up with Sunni and Shia living peacefully with each other, celebrating holidays together, worshiping in the same mosques. When the U.S. pulled out of the region, there was an aid vacuum created, and the Saudies funded thousands of religious groups in Pakistan. This is turn declared Shia as Pakistan’s heritage. This is a division that has been poked and prodded and revitalized continually in the modern era by one of the biggest U.S. allies, Saudi Arabia.

To listen to the entire interview, CLICK HERE or visit http://wsradio.com/090414-rafia-zakaria-author-attorney-human-rights-activist/.

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In a past blog, I predicted the failure of Kofi Anan's mediation efforts. This was no magical feat on my part. Anyone with an once of experience in mediation could see that Mr. Anan was the wrong person at the wrong time with the wrong skills for the job. While he is a famous international diplomat, he is not and never has been a trained, professional mediator. That became apparent as he violated mediation principle after principle during his tenure. His resignation, accompanied by a public statement excoriating the international community, was more of a reflection of how he misread and misunderstood the conflict than about the political will of the UN Security Council.

What now? Clearly, a negotiated peace between the Assad regime and the opposition forces is unlikely. Iran and Russia have publicly supported the Assad regime and cannot gracefully retreat without significant loss of international prestige. For the Iranians, in particular, that is unacceptable. Thus, the conflict will have to play out to the end with Bashar al Assad being deposed or running for asylum. His mindset is unfortunately locked into a belief structure that will not allow him to see reality. Hence, he is as likely to be killed in office as to retire from it.

If anyone is thinking in the international community, they should be planning on how to prevent all out chaos and anarchy in Syria post-Assad. With the removal of the Alawites from power, there will a vacuum crying to be filled. A host of interests are eager to rush in, including Shiite fundamentalists, Sunni fundamentalists, al Queda-affiliated forces, and the Muslim Brotherhood. The Syrian people are not experienced in the tug and pull of democracy, do not have a strong civil society, and do not have foundational institutions to allow for a free society. These all have to be built from scratch. At the same time, the bureaucracy has to remain functional to provide basic services. Hopefully, the world learned that lesson from Iraq and Libya.

If mediators can assist at all, they will work on the inevitable conflicts arising in the opposition forces and help the various factions form political coalitions that approach independent self-determination.  This is messy, difficult work. Once the common enemy, Bashar al Assad, is gone, the glue holding together the opposition will melt away. Finding common purpose in a peaceful, nonviolent transition to an appropriate form of government will be very challenging. It will take courageous, visionary Syrian leadership to guide the people.

In addition, the internal factions will face the prospect of dealing with outside spoilers. Those spoilers could include Russia and Iran, looking to maintain and perhaps strengthen their influence in the new Syria. The US and European powers could also be spoilers if they see disadvantage to a truly independent, self-determinative Syria. The Kurds are also a wild card, and may negate Turkey's potentially positive influence on the Syrian outcome. The only way the outside power players can be thwarted is if the Syrian factions unite against outside interference. This poses a classic Prisoner's Dilemma situation for the Syrian factions as the decision to defect from cooperation with other factions may appear more attractive than agreeing to cooperate and facing the possibility of exploitation. Again, mediators might be able to facilitate the decision making process towards cooperation and away from self-interested choices that will ultimately defeat a peaceful Syria.

The experiences in the Middle East over the past 10 years should inform us all that classic international power politics is more likely to generate war than peace. The international powers certainly are not oriented to stability. Instead, they continue to joust for influence by thwarting each other's ambitions and interests. Thus, if the Syrian people want peace and self-determination they will need the discipline to turn away from the power inducements of the west or of Russia and Iran. They will have to turn inward and solve their own problems in their own way. They can do this with the help of skilled mediators. Time will tell if that is the path they choose.

Segment 1: “We’re going to war.”

Our guest on this edition of The Doug Noll Show is no stranger to war and espionage. Art Keller is a former CIA officer who served in the Counter-Proliferation Division, a unit responsible for spying on and sabotaging Weapons of Mass Destruction programs. He also has worked on terrorism cases and his last assignment was as acting Chief of Base in the tribal areas of Pakistan.

Art’s personal journey began after high school, when he joined the army and then studied foreign affairs in college. His interest in foreign affairs led him to apply to the CIA and after an arduous selection process (he applied multiple times, and later found out that was the norm) he was accepted into the CIA organization. He wound up in the Counter-Proliferation Division with instructions to keep an eye on weapons of mass destruction. It was Art’s job to cover Iran’s missile program, and he does not believe that Saddam Hussein ever had weapons of mass destruction (WMD). However, his Chief of Station returned from headquarters and announced that “the decision had already been made: we’re going to war.” It was shocking.

Segment 2: A Corrupted Process.

In order to make the best policies, the policy makers need to know what’s really happening in a particular area. If we shape our intelligence around our policy objective (instead of the other way around) the process will be corrupted. Art spent a few months in 2003 and 2004 near Baghdad in 140 degree weather looking for weapons in the desert. By August 2003 it was clear to him that he was just going through the motions, but he had his marching orders and dutifully followed them out. He became certain there were no WMDs to be found. No one came forward with any viable information.

Segment 3: The Slow and Meticulous Dance.

The negotiations have resumed with Iran and the West over Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Historically, peacemaking arms control has been a very slow and meticulous dance. There is a lot of distrust. From the viewpoint of the U.S., Iran hasn’t wanted to negotiate in good faith. Art says Iranians think very differently from us, but they do think. They have a very keenly developed sense of their own self-interest, which does not include having their whole country destroyed. A lot of it has to do with national pride. For example, they can’t believe Pakistan has a nuclear weapon and they don’t.

Art is greatly concerned about Israel and how they take actions without considering American interest. They have a proven record of bombing other people’s nuclear facilities (Iraq and Syria) as well as assassinating weapon scientists. It is an established pattern.

Segment 4: It’s Not About the Gadgets.

The CIA’s definition of assassination is killing someone - usually for political reasons - from a country with whom you are not at war. Art’s book, Hollow Strength, is about assassinations, secrets and espionage. It’s technically fiction but is based on his real life experiences. Human Intelligence is not about gadgets; it’s about relationships with people. Ask yourself this question: How bad would it have to be in your own country for you to be a spy for another country?  

To listen to the complete interview:

Segment 1

Segment 2

Segment 3

Segment 4

In early January 2012, the Obama administration sent a letter to the Iranian government through diplomatic channels. The letter stated the consequences of an Iranian attempt to block the Strait of Hormuz and requested direct talks. Whether Iran agrees to talk remains to be seen. Certainly, the talks will be secret and low level unless they produce tangible benefits for both sides. How would a professional mediator approach these talks as a negotiator?
Understanding the interests of both the Iranian and American perspectives is a critical first step.
The Iranian government first and foremost wants to protect its power, position, and privilege from internal and external threats. The Shia Islamic regime sees as many threats from Sunni Islam as from the West. The Bush presidency handed Iran a rare opportunity to gather power and influence in the Middle East when Bush decided to topple Iran’s primary enemy, Sadaam Hussein. Since the overthrow of Hussein and his Baathist regime, Iran has increased its influence in Iraq through its support of the Iraqi Shia. Iran has an interest in preserving and increasing its influence over Iraqi politics. Likewise, Iran wishes to see the al Assad regime retain its power in Syria. Iran also wants to avoid a situation in which the United States, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, among others, decide to bring down the al Assad regime. To the east, Iran wishes to exert influence in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which are bordering countries.
In summary, the Iranian interests are regime preservation, increased political and economic influence in the region, and continued support of Shia Islamists. It does not want a war with the West.
American interests are likewise straightforward. America does not want oil supplies disrupted; it does not want failed states in the region to be sanctuaries for terrorists; it does not want a war with Iran; it does not want Islamic sectarian strife to widen or intensify; it wants stable political and economic regimes in oil producing countries; it would like to see governments in the region respect human rights more consistently; it would like to see Iran abandon nuclear weapons development. The US is or soon will be discussing peace with various Taliban elements as a prelude to exiting Afghanistan. Iran has levers it can pull in Afghanistan and Pakistan that could block those discussions. The US therefore does not want Iranian interference in talks with the Taliban.
Political realities will also influence these conversations. The initial representatives of both countries will not be high level policy makers. They will each have limited authority to make concessions and no authority to make binding agreements. Their conduct will be scrutinized by opposition elements in each country and subject to severe criticism. Thus, the early conversations will be conservative, confirmatory, and exploratory. They will be conservative because the domestic political realities will not permit a radical shift in the strategic relationship between Iran and America. They will be confirmatory as each side assesses whether their working hypotheses of each other’s interests are correct. They will be exploratory as each side tests for potential gains from continued discussions.
Negotiation style, modulated by culture, will also be an important element of preparation. The Iranians may at times demonstrate aggressive, threatening negotiating behaviors. The Iranian government wants to be respected and feared, internally and externally. National pride is significant, bringing the psychology of identity into the negotiation. American negotiators may be more linear and bottom line oriented. The negotiations might be something like rug merchant meets used car salesman. Frustration over negotiating styles should be anticipated. Preparing for a conflict in negotiation customs, methods, and styles will therefore be important.
Trust and accountability will also be an issue requiring preparation. When the value of what is being negotiated is well known and the exchange mechanisms are well-established, successful negotiations can occur with very little trust. In this negotiation there will be no easily determined valuation of interests and certainly no agreed upon exchange mechanism. Thus, trust becomes a central issue. How will each side assure itself that the other side will abide by agreements?
Similarly, the talks will have to occur secretly. However, one side or the other might see an opportunity to exploit the situation by talking to the media. Maintaining confidentiality will be a challenge.
This is a situation that calls for preparation, analysis, and role play rehearsal. The US representatives would be well-served to practice in simulated negotiation sessions that explore all of the challenges and roadblocks that might be anticipated with the Iranians. They should master a number of different negotiation processes including integrative as well as distributive processes. They should be psychologically prepared for any number of possible behaviors and have counter-tactics for each. They should be skilled at listening for what is being said and for paying close attention to what is not being said. Likewise, they should pay close attention to what they say, how they say it, and what they do not say.
These will not be mediated conversations. US-Iranian back-channel negotiations have a poor track record so there is no reason for optimism. However, conversations of any kind are better than silence and certainly better than war. The US can improve the chances of success by careful and thorough preparation of its representatives.

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As a professional peacemaker, I tend to look at conflicts from the perspective of the people instead of politics. In the process of mediating thousands of conflicts, large and small, I find that conflict dynamics tend to fall into predictable patterns. This is especially true in family business conflicts. The same themes arise over and over again such that the conflict dynamics are predictable and systematic.

 While reading about the Syrian uprising some months ago, I read a brief mention of President Bashar al-Assad's younger brother, Maher. Maher, as it turns out, controls the military and is apparently the one responsible for the violent oppression of the protesters. I had wondered about that because Bashar was trained as medical doctor--an opthamologist---with no interest in politics or power until he was recalled to Syria by his father, the late Hafez al-Assad. So why would a western-trained physician married to a British-born Syrian woman who was a Citibank investment banker, lead his country into civil war? It began to sound like a classic family business conflict. When I started digging, I found all of the elements that I routinely see in deep conflicts. Of course, this is all highly speculative as I have never met the Assads or anyone that knows them. However, the superficial parallels to the trajectory of a family business suggest that the Syrian civil war is the result of an on-going, essentially unresolved, family business conflict.

 Here's the analysis I have constructed from the public records.

 The Family Business Founder

 Hafez al Assad assumed power in Syria, founding the family business. He essentially forced a buyout in a bloodless military coup in November 1970 as he capitalized on  internal conflict between the Baath Party’s more moderate military wing and more extremist civilian wing. Like any family business founder, he established an authoritarian regime with power concentrated in his own hands. His thirty-year presidency was characterized by a cult of personality, developed in order to maintain control over a potentially restive population and to provide cohesion and stability to the government. This management approach to government, while creating stability and wealth for the family, came at a cost. Dissent was harshly eliminated, the most extreme example being the brutal suppression in February 1982 of the Muslim Brotherhood. Moreover, the country’s economy suffered, and progress was hindered by an overstaffed and inefficient public sector run overwhelmingly according to Baath Party dictates.

 From the founder's perspective, however, all was well. Hafez had three sons, Basil, Bashar, and Maher, and a daughter Bushra. As is typical in many family businesses, the oldest son Basil, was crowned as the successor and heir-apparent.

 From a young age, Basil was groomed to be the next president of Syria. He was chief of presidential security while running a highly publicized anti-corruption campaign within the regime, and frequently appeared in full military uniform at official receptions, signaling the regime's commitment to the armed forces. He also had a reputation for driving fast cars and living a faster life.

 The Succession Plan Goes Awry

 In January 1994, driving his Mercedes at high speed through fog to Damascus International Airport  Basil crashed into a motorway roundabout and died instantly. The succession plan was just thrown out the window, and with it the seeds of future conflict were sown into the soil of Syria. Basil was sometimes referred to as "Basil the Martyr", and numerous squares and streets have been named after him. His statue is found in several Syrian cities, and even after his death he is often pictured at billboards with his father and brother. Thus, in his death, he continues to symbolize the aspirations of his late father.

 The Physician Turned Dictator

 Unlike his brothers, Basil and Maher, and his sister, Bushra, Bashar al-Assad was quiet and reserved. Bashar had no interest in politics or the military and, until Basil's death, never talked about politics with his father.

 Bashar excelled during his primary and secondary education in the Arab-French al-Hurriya School in Damascus. In 1982, he graduated from high school and studied medicine at Damascus University. In 1988, he graduated from medical school and began working as an army doctor in Syria's biggest military hospital. Four years later, he went to the United Kingdom for postgraduate training in ophthalmology. Bashar became fluent in French and English, and while in London, met and married a Syrian-born British investment banker. At the time, Bashar had few political aspirations and looked destined to have a normal professional career as a second son of a political leader. Thus, to his surprise, he was recalled in 1994 to join the Syrian army, after Basil's unexpected death. Without his consent, he had been appointed by his father as the family successor.

 Over the next six and half years, until his death in 2000, Hafez groomed Bashar for power. To establish his military credentials, Bashar entered the military academy at Homs. He was fast-tracked to colonel in five years. To consolidate the military power base for Bashar, old divisional commanders were retired and replaced with young Alawite officers loyal to the family. In public affairs, Bashar was granted wide powers. He became a political adviser to his father, was head of the bureau to receive complaints and appeals of citizens, and led a campaign against corruption.

 Hafez al Assad died in 2000. The Syrian parliament immediately passed a law reducing the qualifying age for president from 40 to 34 and unanimously affirmed Bashar as president. In a general referendum, Bashar received 97 percent approval from the Syrian public.

 The Younger Brother-Power Behind the Throne?

 Maher al-Assad, Bashar's youngest brother, was born on December 8, 1967. Like his brothers and sisters, he was raised out of the public spotlight. Maher went to the Academy of Freedom School for his secondary education and studied business at Damascus University. After graduation, he pursued a career in the military. When Basil died, Maher was considered as a possible successor to Hafez. Maher's reputation as hot-tempered perhaps influenced Hafez's decision to appoint Bashar as heir to the family business.

 After Basil's death, Maher assumed command of a brigade in the Republican Guard and distinguished himself as a good commander. His time as brigade commander allowed him to gain valuable military experience and build personal ties with his officers. After the death of his father in 2000, he was promoted from major to lieutenant colonel. and became commander of the Republican Guard. The Republican Guard is a 10,000 strong unit whose loyalty is said to be guaranteed by the revenue it receives from the Deir ez-Zor oil fields. Maher also became commander of the army's elite Fourth Armored Division.

 In June 2000, Maher was elected to the ruling Baath Party's central committee.

 Maher  has been alleged to be deeply involved in many corrupt schemes. According to Fortune Magazine, Maher benefited from the billion dollar money laundering operation at the Lebanese al-Madina bank. Al-Madina was used to launder kickback money of Iraqi officials and their partners in  illegal profiteering from the UN's oil-for-food program. Sources put the amount laundered through al-Madina at more than $1 billion, with a 25 percent commission going to Syrian officials, including Maher.

 Maher has often appeared in public with Bashar and is said to be one of his closest advisers.

 Maher, along with his brother-in-law General Assef Shawqat, who is married to sister Bushra, and Bashar are said to form the inner circle of power in the Assad regime. Shawqat was the former head of intelligence.

 Since the beginning of the Syrian uprising in mid-March, Maher's troops have played a key role in violently suppressing protests in the southern city of Daraa, the coastal city of Banias, the central province of Homs and the northern province of Idlib.

 The United States imposed sanctions on Maher for human rights violations in Syria. The EU sanctioned Maher for being the principal overseer of violence against demonstrators during the 2011 Syrian uprising.

Conflict Over Direction of the Family Business

 As I noted above, father's governance of the family business was characterized by stability and centralized rule based on his personal authority. Bashar, faced with the difficulties of his time, chose to lead ‘his’ Syria in a different direction. These ‘plans’ for a regime change received wide attention under the metaphor ‘Damascus Spring’ and included broad economic and political reforms. It was a period of high optimism among the Syrians: the period saw the emergence of some seventy ‘dialogue clubs’ for discussions between Syria’s civil society and its political elites - opposition parties played an active role in this period - and two private magazines, Ad-Dumari and Al-Iqtisadiyya, began operations. Bashar had great liberalizing plans as indicated by his inaugural speech to the nation on July 17, 2000.

 His plans were short-lived, however. Maher, apparently incensed at the loss of power, position, and privilege a liberalized Syria would mean, eventually convinced Bashar to back away. Bashar quickly learned that he was surrounded by men who ascended to power under the old patronage system. They were inclined not to give up their power to the masses.

 Resolution

 The US-led invasion of Iraq ended the Damascus Spring as the Syrian elites feared liberalization would destroy their power, position, and privilege.  Bashar probably was moved away from his personal inclinations by a complex calculus that included his sense of obligation and loyalty to his father and family, his belief that Maher as his replacement would be a real tyrant, his thought that he could play a moderating force on the extreme elements of the Syrian leadership, concern for his personal safety and security and that of his family, and protection of his personal position, privilege, and power. As a result, he acceded to his brother's advice and allowed the government to clamp down again on dissent, liberalization, and creation of a civil society based on the rule of law.

 The decision led to another 10 years of relative stability in Syria. However, the oppression of the Sunni majority, the continued corruption, and the absence of economic opportunity for young Syrians created the same dynamic as was seen in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. In this case, however, the family's business partners, Russia, China, and Iran, have provided shelter from the rest of the international community. Civil war has been the result.

 At the present, I would guess that personalities dominate the inner circle. Bashar is by far the best educated, but is quiet and reserved. Maher is not stupid, but apparently has a violent temper that is just barely controlled. We don't know much about brother-in-law Shawqat, but it does not take much to imagine that the former head of the state intelligence apparatus is strong-willed. It looks like two against one in the family board room fights.

 Bashar's Dilemma

 I would not be surprised if Bashar al-Assad to this day is deeply conflicted over his choices. He might be a true tyrant, but his background, education, professional training and chosen life trajectory before recall to Syria suggests otherwise. I think Bashar al-Assad is a liberal man caught in a Byzantine world of Syrian politics and power. He cannot escape safely because he knows too much and has compromised too much. I doubt, however, unless he is deeply self-deceptive, that he sleeps well at night. He might be fooling himself, but I think he is too intelligent to be completely self-deceptive.

 Advice from the Family Business Consultant

 The business is bankrupt. It was probably insolvent at the time Bashar took it over from his father. His reorganization plan had no chance of success because the entrenched interests could not tolerate the change. Yet, his plan was probably the only path to avoid eventual violence and civil war. Bashar has no easy way out. If he could find a way to move his family to safety, he might consider resigning. His brother Maher or brother-in-law Assef Shawqat would probably assume power, and the civil war would intensify as the insurgents saw his resignation as validation of their power. From Bashar's perspective, resignation would make matters worse, not better, for the Syrian people. He has already been labeled a war criminal for allowing his brother to brutalize civilian populations. He probably faces indictment from the ICC for war crimes and human rights abuses. Resignation would also be a betrayal of family, which is unthinkable in his culture.

 Remaining in power is not viable either. Even the normally quiescent and malleable Arab League has condemned his government and is preparing to impose stiff sanctions. Turkey has threatened to cut off Syria's electricity. Both the US and the EU are escalating economic and political sanctions. Only the objections of Russia and China prevent the Security Council from condemning the Assad regime and bringing the full force of the international community against it.

 If this were a true family business, my advice would be to sell or liquidate. The conflict will only destroy the remaining family wealth. Even if the current civil war can somehow be stopped, there is no long term upside for the Assad family. The oppression will not stop the protests and cannot contain the Sunni majority forever. The dramatically changed political environment in the Middle East no longer tolerates autocratic rule when that rule is harsh and despotic. Thus, the new business environment dictates a radical change in strategy.

  And, at the end of it all, there is the moral dilemma. How does a liberally trained opthamalogist married to an investment banker live with himself over the deaths of 4,000 civilians, clear and present inequity and injustice, and continued government sanctioned-violence perpetrated in his name?

 My advice, as a professional peacemaker, is to resign and face the consequences of past decisions. The shame of family betrayal will be great, but staying in the business will only lead to greater personal, family, and national betrayal. The Assad family business conflict doesn't seem a lot different than a lot of other family business conflicts and the outcomes are just as sad and predictable.

Douglas E. Noll is a lawyer turned peacemaker, professional mediator, and author of Elusive Peace: How Modern Diplomatic Strategies Could Better Resolve World Conflicts (Prometheus Books, 2011).www.elusivepeace.com

In the lull after the media frenzy around Irene, it is a good time to reflect on the Israeli-Palestinian situation. In a few weeks, the Palestinians will submit a resolution to the UN General Assembly that asks that Palestine be declared a new nation-state. Regardless of where you might stand on this issue, there are a lot of practical problems with the resolution. Besides the fact that the US will veto it in the Security Council, it is politically meaningless as long as Hamas and Fatah remain irrconciliably opposed to each other on fundamental issues of economic reform, governance, and recognition of Israel's right to exist. It's pretty hard to organize a nation-state when there are two bitterly opposed parties that cannot agree on what that state will look like.
Khaled Mashaal, who leads Hamas as its political bureau chief, must be wondering what the future will bring. Although safely enscounced in Damascus, he is at the epicenter of the Syrian uprising. He has been watching the revolutions in the Arab world as one corrupt regime after another is challenged by the people. In his Damascus headquarters, he has a front row seat to the violent and brutal repression of the Sunni majority by the al-Assad brothers. Maschaal appears to be a smart man, so he must be aware that the uprisings have had some effect on the Palestinian people in Gaza. Is Hamas' rule strong or tenuous? Hard to say, but life is not improving in Gaza due to Hamas. I wonder how long the Palestinian people will put up with the deprivation? Mashaal's power is based on war and violence, not peace. He is able to hold up the Israelis has evil oppressors, occupiers of sacred homeland, and opposed to justice for the Palestinian people. Take away the conflict and his power evaporates.
Fatah, in the West Bank, is slightly better off. Its non-elected "prime minister" Salam Fayyad has worked hard to created the beginning of a nation state, with economic reforms, a vastly improved security system, and relatively clean government. The head of Fatah, Mamoud Abbas, continues to take criticism for Fayyad. Despite the incursions of Israeli settlements, the Palestinians in the West Bank seem much better off than their counter parts in Gaza. Abbas and Fayyad seem to be the moderates in the triangle. While not overt peace leaders, they will endorse any agreement that is decent, fair, and sensible.
The Palestinian Authority, the nominal "government" of a nascent Palestinian state, has limited capacity as a self-governing body, both in policy and implementation. It lacks control over natural resources, borders, revenue generation, and the movement of persons, goods, and services within its walled, fragmented, and colonized territory. It lacks the material resources and institutional infrastructure to be a redistributive and interventionist state. Most of its public revenue comes from other countries, notably the United States (about $600 million per year), and its economy remains under the grip of Israel.
Netanyahu's government in Israel is facing economic protests over policies that have made the Israeli rich wealthier and have decimated the middle and lower economic classes. Netanyahu has used the conflict with the Palestinians as justification for many of his policies. In addition, Israel sucks up 20 percent of the total US foreign aid dollar. In 2011, the US will give Israel $3 billion in direct foreign aid or about $500 per Israeli citizen. This suggests to me that, like Mashaal, he cannot make peace with the Palestinians for the simple reason that his biggest reason for political existence will disappear with a decent peace agreement. Yes, the Zionist extremists are trying to drive the Israeli bus. At the end of the day, however, a strong peace leader will tell them to shut up, sit down, and behave themselves, and they will.
In the larger context, word is coming out of Egypt that a segment of the Egyptian population wants to revisit the Israeli peace accords. Other countries in the region are struggling with post-regime change reality or are on the verge of dealing with the problems of popular governance. Iran has spies everywhere, doing its best to stir up trouble for its Arab and Israeli enemies.
As the news media moves towards the next international feeding frenzy, which absent some unexpect international catastrophe or political incident, I predict will be the UN Assembly vote on Palestinian statehood, keep in mind that peace only comes with the installation of courageous peace leaders. Neither Israel nor the Palestinians have strong peace leaders. They are led by men who see continued violence and conflict, if properly contained, as serving their personal, political, and economic interests. Thus, for peace to occur, there will have to be regime changes instigated by the people, either through elections or protests, or both. There is no hope for peace as long as the current triumvirate of leaders is in the political mix of Israeli-Palestinian politics.
The UN Assembly vote, if it comes to pass, will be like Hurricane Irene, a lot of wind, water, and froth, but no real significance in the long term prospects for peace. The real hurricane rests with the people, and when they decide to move, change will happen suddenly, forcefully, and in a big storm surge of peace.

Doug Noll is a professional mediator and peacemaker. His latest book is Elusive Peace: How Modern Diplomatic Strategies Could Better Resolve World Conflicts (Prometheus Books, 2011)