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Dr. Frank Romano: Professor, Author and Middle East Peace Activist

Segment 1: Grassroots Efforts. Our guest on this edition of the Doug Noll show is Dr. Frank Romano, professor, peace activist and author three books, including his most recent, Love and Terror in the Middle East. Frank earned a PhD at University of Paris I, Pantheon Sorbonne, and a JD at Golden Gate University in San Francisco. Originally Dr. Romano wanted to become a diplomat, but after spending some time abroad he realized, with the help of a vision that came to him, that he would rather go to the Middle East and do interfaith casework. He’s now engaged in dialogues and projects to bring Christian and Muslim groups together in peace. He is also involved in peace marches and demonstrations. His goal is to bring people’s attention to Israel and the West Bank via grassroots efforts.

Segment 2: The Bonding is Intense. Dr. Romano organizes dialogues and marches to bring the conscious awareness of the world to what’s going on in Israel. He feels strongly that we can’t just talk; we need to walk the talk. Do something. Work on projects. Start with conversations and go into ruined schools and businesses and fix them. Replant trees. In his work he has had Muslims, Jews, Christians, Atheists, and agnostics all working together. Few words are exchanged, but the bonding is intense.

Segment 3: When Money, Power and Greed Get Involved. Frank feels that only with strong leadership can a country attain peace. Most politicians listen to the masses before they make any decisions. A real leader take steps to do the right thing --- perhaps even compromising his or her own political career in the process of making tough, sometimes unpopular decisions. They leave money, power and greed aside. And despite the challenge, they are ready to step up, take risks, and do the right thing.

Israel is the largest recipient of U.S. aid, as well as the largest recipient of non-military foreign aid. We subsidize the Israeli military and much of the Israeli government each year, to the tune of billions of dollars. We give three billion dollars to Israel, without any conditions. We have leverage, so why don’t we use it? Because politicians are afraid to confront AIPAC, for one reason. They are afraid to step up. When money, power and greed get involved, some politicians lose the ability to feel empathy and compassion, and become instead a machine to be used.

Segment 4: Divided by Walls. Frank tries to give equal time and attention to the West Bank and Israel, but in practice he goes to the West Bank more often because there is a greater need. Many people are afraid to go there for peace work, although in reality there is little risk. Getting into the West Bank is a real challenge, however. There are many checkpoints and walls. In fact, large Palestinian communities cannot connect with others because they are divided by walls that protect the settlements, as well as the highways used by the Israeli Jews to travel between Israel to the settlements. Palestinians are excluded from those roads. To learn more about Dr. Romano’s work, please visit his website: www.frankromano-lt.com.

To listen to the entire interview:

Dr. Izzeldin Abuelaish: Wisdom is Stronger than Bombs

Segment 1: Conflict is Caused by Fear.

Our guest on this edition of The Doug Noll Show is the esteemed Dr. Izzeldin Abuelaish, a Palestinian medical doctor who has dedicated his life to raising awareness for peace between Israel and Palestine. Dr. Abuelaish is also the founder of Daughters for Life, a foundation established to advance the education and health of girls and women from the Middle East.

Dr. Abuelaish believes the Palestinians need to be responsible for their own lives and for their own health and well-being, but the world needs to help them. It’s a mutual responsibility. A lot of conflict is caused by fear. In order to overcome that deep seated fear we need to be open and honest. Most fear comes from misinformation, a psychological barrier or ignorance. It’s easy to hide behind fear, but we must take responsibility to face our fears and learn about other cultures in order to find common ground.

Segment 2: No Child is Born a Warrior.

It is fear, ignorance and greed that drive the vast majority of violence and conflict. Humans become habitual in the way they view the world and violence becomes a means to an end. It is difficult to end that cycle. Dr. Abuelaish thinks once we have justice in life, we can attain peace. Once we have the human values we were born with, we have no need for violence. Violence is a disease and must be studied and treated as a disease. This disease is man-made; it is manufactured. No child is born a warrior. The best thing to do, if you want to remove violence and fear, is to change the environment in which children are raised.

Segment 3: Wisdom is Stronger than Bombs.

Dr. Abuelaish says it’s time for the international community to step up and tell the Israeli government that its attitude toward the Palestinians is not tolerable and we need to have peace in the region. Any progress in the peace process is for the interest of the world, not just for the Palestinians. It will save the Israelis from their self-destructive behavior. The solution is there; now all it takes is the governments to come together and make it happen. It’s time to start to build some trust. Let the actions speak. It’s time for us to ask, “What world do we want for our children? What legacy do we want them to have? What do we want them to inherit?”

Despite unimaginable tragedy, Dr. Abuelaish says he is not a victim. The death of his daughters just strengthened his resolve to work tirelessly for peace and justice and freedom. Anger and violence is a destructive disease to the one who carries it. Wisdom and good deeds are stronger than bullets and bombs.

Segment 4: Daughters for Life Foundation.

The Daughters for Life Foundation was established in memory of his daughters. Its goal is to promote education of girls and women from the Middle East --- girls who have the potential but not the resources. The most efficient and effective means for change is to invest in the education of girls and women and to enable them to reach their full potential. The child who is educated will have educated children. With that, Dr. Abuelaish can keep his daughters’ memories alive. To learn more about Dr. Abuelaish and his invaluable work, visit http://www.daughtersforlife.com/.>

To listen to the entire interview:

Negotiating with the Iranians-A Primer

In early January 2012, the Obama administration sent a letter to the Iranian government through diplomatic channels. The letter stated the consequences of an Iranian attempt to block the Strait of Hormuz and requested direct talks. Whether Iran agrees to talk remains to be seen. Certainly, the talks will be secret and low level unless they produce tangible benefits for both sides. How would a professional mediator approach these talks as a negotiator?
Understanding the interests of both the Iranian and American perspectives is a critical first step.
The Iranian government first and foremost wants to protect its power, position, and privilege from internal and external threats. The Shia Islamic regime sees as many threats from Sunni Islam as from the West. The Bush presidency handed Iran a rare opportunity to gather power and influence in the Middle East when Bush decided to topple Iran’s primary enemy, Sadaam Hussein. Since the overthrow of Hussein and his Baathist regime, Iran has increased its influence in Iraq through its support of the Iraqi Shia. Iran has an interest in preserving and increasing its influence over Iraqi politics. Likewise, Iran wishes to see the al Assad regime retain its power in Syria. Iran also wants to avoid a situation in which the United States, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, among others, decide to bring down the al Assad regime. To the east, Iran wishes to exert influence in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which are bordering countries.
In summary, the Iranian interests are regime preservation, increased political and economic influence in the region, and continued support of Shia Islamists. It does not want a war with the West.
American interests are likewise straightforward. America does not want oil supplies disrupted; it does not want failed states in the region to be sanctuaries for terrorists; it does not want a war with Iran; it does not want Islamic sectarian strife to widen or intensify; it wants stable political and economic regimes in oil producing countries; it would like to see governments in the region respect human rights more consistently; it would like to see Iran abandon nuclear weapons development. The US is or soon will be discussing peace with various Taliban elements as a prelude to exiting Afghanistan. Iran has levers it can pull in Afghanistan and Pakistan that could block those discussions. The US therefore does not want Iranian interference in talks with the Taliban.
Political realities will also influence these conversations. The initial representatives of both countries will not be high level policy makers. They will each have limited authority to make concessions and no authority to make binding agreements. Their conduct will be scrutinized by opposition elements in each country and subject to severe criticism. Thus, the early conversations will be conservative, confirmatory, and exploratory. They will be conservative because the domestic political realities will not permit a radical shift in the strategic relationship between Iran and America. They will be confirmatory as each side assesses whether their working hypotheses of each other’s interests are correct. They will be exploratory as each side tests for potential gains from continued discussions.
Negotiation style, modulated by culture, will also be an important element of preparation. The Iranians may at times demonstrate aggressive, threatening negotiating behaviors. The Iranian government wants to be respected and feared, internally and externally. National pride is significant, bringing the psychology of identity into the negotiation. American negotiators may be more linear and bottom line oriented. The negotiations might be something like rug merchant meets used car salesman. Frustration over negotiating styles should be anticipated. Preparing for a conflict in negotiation customs, methods, and styles will therefore be important.
Trust and accountability will also be an issue requiring preparation. When the value of what is being negotiated is well known and the exchange mechanisms are well-established, successful negotiations can occur with very little trust. In this negotiation there will be no easily determined valuation of interests and certainly no agreed upon exchange mechanism. Thus, trust becomes a central issue. How will each side assure itself that the other side will abide by agreements?
Similarly, the talks will have to occur secretly. However, one side or the other might see an opportunity to exploit the situation by talking to the media. Maintaining confidentiality will be a challenge.
This is a situation that calls for preparation, analysis, and role play rehearsal. The US representatives would be well-served to practice in simulated negotiation sessions that explore all of the challenges and roadblocks that might be anticipated with the Iranians. They should master a number of different negotiation processes including integrative as well as distributive processes. They should be psychologically prepared for any number of possible behaviors and have counter-tactics for each. They should be skilled at listening for what is being said and for paying close attention to what is not being said. Likewise, they should pay close attention to what they say, how they say it, and what they do not say.
These will not be mediated conversations. US-Iranian back-channel negotiations have a poor track record so there is no reason for optimism. However, conversations of any kind are better than silence and certainly better than war. The US can improve the chances of success by careful and thorough preparation of its representatives.

What Americans Will Lose if the US Vetoes Palestinian Admission to the UN

Americans could lose a lot if the US exercises its planned veto in the Security Council vote on the Palestinian application for admission to the United Nations. The question that is not being discussed is whether the loss is worth it.

The first thing to know is that the issue is not about Palestinian statehood. The media essentially has it wrong when it describes the UN vote as one creating a Palestinian state. The UN does not have the power to create a state. The issue is whether the Palestinian Authority will be admitted as a member to the UN. There are non-states who are members of the UN, such as the Vatican, and there are states that are not members of the UN, such as Taiwan and Kosovo. Being a member of the UN is not the same as being a state. Thus, the US is really opposing a membershp application, not a referendum on statehood.

Second, to gain admittance to the UN, the Palestinian Authority would have to accept the tenets of the UN Charter. Among other things, this would require a recognition of Israel's right to exist and a rejection of violence. Since Hamas rejects Israel's right to exist, the Palestinian Authority will be placed in a difficult dilemma. It can join the UN and accept Israel's right to exist, or it can reject membership and continue to oppose Israel's right to exist. The unintended consequences of the Palestinian Authority admission to the UN might actually work to the benefit of the US and Israel.The media doesn't talk much about this important issue either.

Third, a US veto against a symbolic membership application that does not have the force of law and may actually advance US and Israeli interests will be very, very costly. A veto will dispel any notion of the US's impartiality as a mediator in the Middle East peace process. A veto will be seen as an implicit endorsement of continued settlement construction in the West Bank. A veto will be seen as implicit endorsement of the non-peace regime of Benjamin Netanyahu. A veto will be viewed as inconsistent with the professed American values of freedom, self-dtermination, and democracy. Thus, a veto may cause important moderate elements the Arab world to turn away from the US as a model of peace, democracy, and protector of human rights. A veto will be used by radical political Islamists to incite further violence against the US, particularly the US military. A veto will harm US efforts to find peaceful solutions in Iraq and Afghanistan. A veto, in short, will make foreign policy initiatives in the Islamic world much more difficult. The cost to ordinary Americans will be reflected in continued unpopular military expenditures and a possible decline in national security, at least overseas.

The pro-Israel lobby and American Jews supporting Israel would say that all of this does not matter. What is important is the survival of Israel. However, they do not explain how the Palestinian membership in the UN threatens Israel's survival. This is a classic example of reactive devaluation: If it's good for the Palestinians, it must be bad for Israel. Israel's supporters are automatically and emotionally rejecting anything that could concievably benefit the Palestinians. Since they see the conflict in purely distributive terms--one side's gain must mean the other side's loss--any Palestinian gain must cause harm to Israel. However, a reasoned examination of the effects and implications of admission to the UN fails to uncover a cost to Israel. How, exactly, is Israel injured by the Palestinian admission to the UN? The media isn't asking this question either.

Finally, President Obama has precious little negotiation leverage over Netanyahu. To remedy the lack of leverage, he should withdraw the US threat of a veto. The more strategic approach might be to say, "The US has not decided on its position on the application of the Palestinian Authority for UN membership. Whether the US votes in favor, opposes, or abstains will depend largely on the willingness demonsrated by the Israelis and the Palestinians to progress towards a durable peace. The US is committed to peace in the region and will support those who aspire for it through their concrete actions. It will not support those who merely talk peace, but are unwilling to compromise." From this position, the US may leverage the parties to the peace table. Netanyahu has to know that the US may not oppose the Palestinian bid for membership in the UN. If he backs off of his hawkish, aggressive positions and compromises with the Palestinian Authority, great. If he remains opposed to compromise, including cessation of settlement construction, he bears the consequences in the Security Council vote. The same is true for the Palestinians.

That kind of sophisticated negotiation strategy seems unlikely because the domestic political costs at the beginning of a presidential electiion cycle will be too high. However, the cost of not alienating the pro-Israel special interests will extract a higher cost for world peace. Ultimately, American taxpayers will have to foot the bill for that price.

Douglas Noll, Lawyer Turned Peacemaker, is the author of Elusive Peace: How Modern Diplomatic Strategies Could Better Resolve World Conflicts (Prometheus Books 2011).

Understanding the Legal Niceties of the Palestinian UN Bid for Statehood

The media will be paying close attention to the Palestinian bid for statehood because that bid sets up a classic human conflict of little guy against Big Guy, of justice vs. injustice, of self-determination and self-rule against opression and autocracy. Moreover, the US, which will oppose the Palestinian bid in the Security Council will be made to look as a power-mongering hypocrite. The media loves this because it sells newspapers and magazines.
However, the legal technicalities will probably escape media attention, and those technicalities are important.They are not that difficult to understand so here's a primer on the process.
First, there is a difference between statehood and membership in the UN. They are not the same thing. For instance, Taiwan is not a member of the UN, but it is a state. The Vatican is considered a state but it is not a member of the UN. Kosovo is considered a state by major powers, including the US and the EU, but it is not a member of the UN. Switzerland only joined the UN in 2002, but it was a state long before then. During the Cold War, many states had their application for membership at the UN vetoed (such as Ireland, Jordan, and some Soviet republics) but this did not mean that they were not states. So the Palestinians may be granted membership in the UN, but that does not confer statehood upon them.
This is complicated by the fact that international legal scholars do not agree on what "statehood" means. Neither the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) or the Montevideo Convention (1936) define the process of the creation of a nation-state. There are two terms used to described the formation of a nation-state: constitutitve and declarative. Constitutive means that a nation-state is recognized as such by other nation-states. Looks like a duck, walks, like a duck, quacks like a duck, must therefore be a duck. Declarative means that in addition to recognition, the nation-state must demonstrate independence from other authority, have defined geographical borders, a defined population, and control over the internal affairs within the borders and with the population. The declarative standard would be difficult for the Palestinians to establish.
All of this makes for good law review writing, but is politically meaningless. The reality is that an international consensus has to form around recognition of a nation-state. When the consensus has formed, there are legal procedures in place to codify the consensus into a legal reality. Without consensus, forming a new nation-state, e.g., Palestine, is impossible.
I should probably mention that consensus, in this context, means that all of the major military/economic powers agree generally on statehood. This is not a majority-rule situation, which is key to understanding the legal and political dynamics of the Palestinian situation. If one major power says no, there is no consensus, and nothing that is legally effective is likely to happen. And having said that, in the 21st century, wielding that kind of veto power may be politically very, very costly if the veto is against the sentiment of the rest of the world.
The process of seeking admission to the UN as a member starts with a formal letter from the leaders of the region seeking recognition as a nation-state to the UN secretary-general asking for acceptance as a full member to the United Nations. (See Rules 134-138) The letter has to include a declaration that the nation-state accepts the principles of the UN Charter. I've search the Internet to see if I could find a copy of any letter. So far, I have been unsuccessful. I don't think the letter has been delivered yet, which is interesting in its own right. Is this whole thing a negotiation ploy by the Palestinians? As a side note, one wonders how President Abbas can speak for Hamas in accepting the UN Charter on behalf of all Palestinians. Since Hamas is dedicated to the destruction of Israel, which would seem to be a violation of the UN Charter, its hard for me to see how the letter can legally be received as a good faith declaration of intent of all Palestinians. But that is a side issue.
When the UN secretary-general receives the letter, he is required to forward it to the current president of the Security Council, which in this case, is Germany. The president must convene a committee to study the request and submit a report to the UN Security Council.
The UN Security Council, upon receipt of the request and the report, debates the issue and votes to approve it or not. In this case, the US, bowing to Israeli political pressure, will veto the request.
If, by some miracle, the Security Council approved the request, the matter would be referred to the General Assembly where the request must be approved by a two-thirds vote. As of early September 2011, that vote would seem assured as 135 out of 196 members have indicated approval of membership for the Palestinians.
If the Security Council does not approve the request, the UN Assembly may pass a resolution approving the request, but the resolution has no force of law.
In essence, the Palestinian application for membership into the UN is a legally futile act. Politically, however, it may require the US to exercise veto power against the will of the vast majority of the members of the General Assembly in favor of Israel. One must wonder about the wisdom of that strategy from both the Israeli and the Palestinian perspective. The US, which is the largest, most significant financial supporter of both regimes, will be the biggest loser.
In summary, if the Palestinians apply for membership in the UN, they will fail. The process will polarize the US Congress in an election year. It will alienate Israel. It will leave the Obama Administration with yet another foreign policy mess. And, it will do nothing to change the status in the region. This looks like another dollar auction situation being played out by President Abbas against the advice of his senior advisors. (See my September 5, 2011 post Libya Needs a New Diplomacy for a description of The Dollar Auction.)
One last interesting point that has escaped the media's attention: If the Palestinians were admitted to membership in the UN, they would have access to the International Criminal Court. Cables released by Wikileaks seem to indicate that Israel considers this possibility, indictment of senior Israeli officials for crimes against humanity, a significant security threat such that Palestinian pursuit of an indictment would "constitute an act of war" against Israel. The existential and primal fear implied by this statement suggests that peace is a distant prospect in the region.

Israeli-Palestinian Conflict-Courageous Peace Leaders Wanted

In the lull after the media frenzy around Irene, it is a good time to reflect on the Israeli-Palestinian situation. In a few weeks, the Palestinians will submit a resolution to the UN General Assembly that asks that Palestine be declared a new nation-state. Regardless of where you might stand on this issue, there are a lot of practical problems with the resolution. Besides the fact that the US will veto it in the Security Council, it is politically meaningless as long as Hamas and Fatah remain irrconciliably opposed to each other on fundamental issues of economic reform, governance, and recognition of Israel's right to exist. It's pretty hard to organize a nation-state when there are two bitterly opposed parties that cannot agree on what that state will look like.
Khaled Mashaal, who leads Hamas as its political bureau chief, must be wondering what the future will bring. Although safely enscounced in Damascus, he is at the epicenter of the Syrian uprising. He has been watching the revolutions in the Arab world as one corrupt regime after another is challenged by the people. In his Damascus headquarters, he has a front row seat to the violent and brutal repression of the Sunni majority by the al-Assad brothers. Maschaal appears to be a smart man, so he must be aware that the uprisings have had some effect on the Palestinian people in Gaza. Is Hamas' rule strong or tenuous? Hard to say, but life is not improving in Gaza due to Hamas. I wonder how long the Palestinian people will put up with the deprivation? Mashaal's power is based on war and violence, not peace. He is able to hold up the Israelis has evil oppressors, occupiers of sacred homeland, and opposed to justice for the Palestinian people. Take away the conflict and his power evaporates.
Fatah, in the West Bank, is slightly better off. Its non-elected "prime minister" Salam Fayyad has worked hard to created the beginning of a nation state, with economic reforms, a vastly improved security system, and relatively clean government. The head of Fatah, Mamoud Abbas, continues to take criticism for Fayyad. Despite the incursions of Israeli settlements, the Palestinians in the West Bank seem much better off than their counter parts in Gaza. Abbas and Fayyad seem to be the moderates in the triangle. While not overt peace leaders, they will endorse any agreement that is decent, fair, and sensible.
The Palestinian Authority, the nominal "government" of a nascent Palestinian state, has limited capacity as a self-governing body, both in policy and implementation. It lacks control over natural resources, borders, revenue generation, and the movement of persons, goods, and services within its walled, fragmented, and colonized territory. It lacks the material resources and institutional infrastructure to be a redistributive and interventionist state. Most of its public revenue comes from other countries, notably the United States (about $600 million per year), and its economy remains under the grip of Israel.
Netanyahu's government in Israel is facing economic protests over policies that have made the Israeli rich wealthier and have decimated the middle and lower economic classes. Netanyahu has used the conflict with the Palestinians as justification for many of his policies. In addition, Israel sucks up 20 percent of the total US foreign aid dollar. In 2011, the US will give Israel $3 billion in direct foreign aid or about $500 per Israeli citizen. This suggests to me that, like Mashaal, he cannot make peace with the Palestinians for the simple reason that his biggest reason for political existence will disappear with a decent peace agreement. Yes, the Zionist extremists are trying to drive the Israeli bus. At the end of the day, however, a strong peace leader will tell them to shut up, sit down, and behave themselves, and they will.
In the larger context, word is coming out of Egypt that a segment of the Egyptian population wants to revisit the Israeli peace accords. Other countries in the region are struggling with post-regime change reality or are on the verge of dealing with the problems of popular governance. Iran has spies everywhere, doing its best to stir up trouble for its Arab and Israeli enemies.
As the news media moves towards the next international feeding frenzy, which absent some unexpect international catastrophe or political incident, I predict will be the UN Assembly vote on Palestinian statehood, keep in mind that peace only comes with the installation of courageous peace leaders. Neither Israel nor the Palestinians have strong peace leaders. They are led by men who see continued violence and conflict, if properly contained, as serving their personal, political, and economic interests. Thus, for peace to occur, there will have to be regime changes instigated by the people, either through elections or protests, or both. There is no hope for peace as long as the current triumvirate of leaders is in the political mix of Israeli-Palestinian politics.
The UN Assembly vote, if it comes to pass, will be like Hurricane Irene, a lot of wind, water, and froth, but no real significance in the long term prospects for peace. The real hurricane rests with the people, and when they decide to move, change will happen suddenly, forcefully, and in a big storm surge of peace.

Doug Noll is a professional mediator and peacemaker. His latest book is Elusive Peace: How Modern Diplomatic Strategies Could Better Resolve World Conflicts (Prometheus Books, 2011)

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