dougnoll’s posthaven

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In a past blog, I predicted the failure of Kofi Anan's mediation efforts. This was no magical feat on my part. Anyone with an once of experience in mediation could see that Mr. Anan was the wrong person at the wrong time with the wrong skills for the job. While he is a famous international diplomat, he is not and never has been a trained, professional mediator. That became apparent as he violated mediation principle after principle during his tenure. His resignation, accompanied by a public statement excoriating the international community, was more of a reflection of how he misread and misunderstood the conflict than about the political will of the UN Security Council.

What now? Clearly, a negotiated peace between the Assad regime and the opposition forces is unlikely. Iran and Russia have publicly supported the Assad regime and cannot gracefully retreat without significant loss of international prestige. For the Iranians, in particular, that is unacceptable. Thus, the conflict will have to play out to the end with Bashar al Assad being deposed or running for asylum. His mindset is unfortunately locked into a belief structure that will not allow him to see reality. Hence, he is as likely to be killed in office as to retire from it.

If anyone is thinking in the international community, they should be planning on how to prevent all out chaos and anarchy in Syria post-Assad. With the removal of the Alawites from power, there will a vacuum crying to be filled. A host of interests are eager to rush in, including Shiite fundamentalists, Sunni fundamentalists, al Queda-affiliated forces, and the Muslim Brotherhood. The Syrian people are not experienced in the tug and pull of democracy, do not have a strong civil society, and do not have foundational institutions to allow for a free society. These all have to be built from scratch. At the same time, the bureaucracy has to remain functional to provide basic services. Hopefully, the world learned that lesson from Iraq and Libya.

If mediators can assist at all, they will work on the inevitable conflicts arising in the opposition forces and help the various factions form political coalitions that approach independent self-determination.  This is messy, difficult work. Once the common enemy, Bashar al Assad, is gone, the glue holding together the opposition will melt away. Finding common purpose in a peaceful, nonviolent transition to an appropriate form of government will be very challenging. It will take courageous, visionary Syrian leadership to guide the people.

In addition, the internal factions will face the prospect of dealing with outside spoilers. Those spoilers could include Russia and Iran, looking to maintain and perhaps strengthen their influence in the new Syria. The US and European powers could also be spoilers if they see disadvantage to a truly independent, self-determinative Syria. The Kurds are also a wild card, and may negate Turkey's potentially positive influence on the Syrian outcome. The only way the outside power players can be thwarted is if the Syrian factions unite against outside interference. This poses a classic Prisoner's Dilemma situation for the Syrian factions as the decision to defect from cooperation with other factions may appear more attractive than agreeing to cooperate and facing the possibility of exploitation. Again, mediators might be able to facilitate the decision making process towards cooperation and away from self-interested choices that will ultimately defeat a peaceful Syria.

The experiences in the Middle East over the past 10 years should inform us all that classic international power politics is more likely to generate war than peace. The international powers certainly are not oriented to stability. Instead, they continue to joust for influence by thwarting each other's ambitions and interests. Thus, if the Syrian people want peace and self-determination they will need the discipline to turn away from the power inducements of the west or of Russia and Iran. They will have to turn inward and solve their own problems in their own way. They can do this with the help of skilled mediators. Time will tell if that is the path they choose.

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As a professional mediator, I am always encouraged by the use of mediation to resolve international conflicts. However, in the case of Syria, I have little confidence that mediation will bring peace to the conflict. Very few of the essential elements for successful mediation are present in this conflict.

The first consideration in convening any mediation is deciding who the parties at the table will be. In this case, the current Syrian government will certainly be a party. However, there does not appear to be a credible spokesperson for the rebels. One of the reasons that international support has not coalesced in support of the rebels like it did in Libya is because the rebels have not proven themselves capable of creating a coherent political force. Since mediation is about decision-making, we have to ask the question: "Who has the power to make binding decisions for the parties?" Obviously, the Syrian government can make decisions. Who, in the rebel group, can make binding decisions for the people that oppose the al Assad regime?

The Syrian National Council claims authority for the resistance against the al Assad regime. Burhan Galioun, a professor of political sociology at the Universite de Paris III Sorbonne University, was appointed as head of the SNC on August 29, 2011. However, Professor Galioun has made statements that are not universally shared by the various rebel factions. It is unlikely that either he or the Syrian National Council speaks for all factions.

One of the issues that plagues peaceful resolution of internal conflicts and civil wars is decision-making authority. It's one thing to mediate a dispute in a contested presidential election, when the disputants are easily recognized as political opponents. It's another thing altogether to mediate the dispute the between a fractious rebel group and an antagonistic government. The al Assad regime can rightfully ask by what authority to the representatives of the rebels come to the table? Any mediator taking on the Syrian problem will spend a considerable amount of time answering that question, and the entire enterprise will collapse if it is not answered thoroughly.

A related issue has to do with legitimizing the antagonists. In the 1970s, the protracted negotiations over the shapes of the tables and who would sit where in the US North Vietnam talks was about legitimizing primary parties at the table. In Syria’s case, the al Assad regime could protest participation of rebel representatives because allowing participation would confer unwanted legitimacy. At the outset, the mediator will have to be prepared to deal with challenges to legitimate participation by primary parties.

The people of Syria have the most at stake in any mediated talks. The mediator will have to consider how to make sure that the legitimate concerns of the people, which will include social and distributive injustices, political inclusion, economic reform, safety from violence and social stability. In this regard, the mediator may consider finding civil society representatives, including women, to participate as direct and primary participants. The mediator will have to secure the consent of the rebel representatives and the government representatives to share decision-making power with civil society representatives who otherwise would not have a voice in the process.

In addition to primary parties, mediation involves secondary parties. In the case of Syria, the secondary parties are numerous. They include Hamas, Iran, Russia and China, the US, Israel, and the EU, the Arab League, the UN, the Muslim Brotherhood, Sunni Arab nations such as Saudi Arabia, and other conservative Islamic groups. All of these parties have vested and conflicting interests in the outcome of the Syrian conflict. All of these parties wish to influence the outcome to benefit their particular interests. They will be seeking direct participation at the table. If they are denied participation of the table, they will seek to influence the process in other ways, including as spoilers. The mediator will have to design a process that provides for secondary party participation and inclusion, but does not permit undue interference in the direct talks between the primary parties.

Assuming that agreements can be reached upon who will participate in the process, the mediator will be confronted with what is to be mediated. The superficial answer will be to mediate a political solution to the violence. However, that is grossly insufficient to bring about a lasting peace. As we have seen in Kenya, the superficial political solution has led to continued gross economic and social injustice, continued tribal conflict, and the essential shutdown of an effective government. The Sentinel Project observes that Kenya is ripe for genocide. (http://thesentinelproject.org/wp-content/uploads/Risk-Assessment-Kenya-2011.pdf). I believe this is a direct result of the failure of the mediator to force Odinga and Kibaki to address serious structural injustices instead choosing to seek superficial political solutions through an ineffective and unworkable power-sharing arrangement.

The same problem exists in Syria, except that it is worse. Rather than mediating a contested presidential election, the mediator will have to end a civil war and deal with generations of abuse, injustice, and human rights violations. Burhan Ghalioun, the appointed head of the Syrian National Council, is skeptical of dialogue with the al Assad regime. “The regime is not interested in or willing to meet the requirements of a meaningful dialogue,” Ghalioun wrote. The opposition cannot join dialogue with “officials who contributed to or ordered the killing of defenseless children, women, and young people.” He has said that dialogue would be fruitless unless the clear objective was “to dismantle the regime of repression, oppression, and tyranny and replace it with a democratic order in which the people alone have the final say and the government is fully empowered and answerable to elected representatives of the people.”

Ghalioun believes that “dialogue should not mean a deal with the regime. It must not be about broadening the circle of participation” to members of the authorities; rather “it must be about a timetable for a transition to democracy by peaceful means, in the hope of avoiding more human casualties and material losses, and creating the necessary conditions for new institutions to be built and function properly.” To Ghalioun, the government leaders “lost their legitimacy” when they unleashed bloody violence against peaceful protesters.

From these statements, it is clear that if the mediator seeks a superficial political solution through power-sharing, without forcing the parties to confront the centuries old conflicts between the Alawites, the Sunnis, and the Syrian minorities, the mediation will make the situation worse, not better.

Thus, the mediator will be well advised to discuss what is to be mediated and to explore the potential range of outcomes that will be satisfactory to all of the participants. This exploration by itself will be time-consuming and exhausting as it will consist of a negotiation over what is to be negotiated. However, that is the work of the mediator and is to be anticipated and planned for.

Finally, does the mediator have the staying power that the Syrian mediation will require? In the Kenyan election crisis, the mediator abandoned the mediation process after six weeks and turned it over to another mediator who abandoned the process six weeks after that. There was no long-term plan for engagement and no plan for helping the parties resolve ongoing differences and conflicts. Will the mediator in the Syrian conflict be committed to the years it may take to bring peace to Syria? This is not a six week or six-month engagement. The intractability of the dispute and the ongoing violence suggests that a mediated negotiation might last for years. Even then, success will be problematic.

International conflict mediation has not been typified by exemplary mediation practice. Instead, most international conflict mediations have been ad hoc affairs conducted by diplomats and political envoys with little or no experience in decision making theory, conflict theory, neuro social psychology, behavioral economics, and a host of other disciplines that modern mediators study and practice. The Syrian conflict will call upon the deepest skills and reserves of the very best mediator. Even then, a peaceful resolution is improbable. I hope that the mediator considers some of these issues before he starts his work.

Douglas E. Noll is author of the award-winning book Elusive Peace: How Modern Diplomatic Strategies Could Better Resolve World Conflicts (Prometheus Books 2011). He may reached through the book website, www.elusivepeace.com.

In early January 2012, the Obama administration sent a letter to the Iranian government through diplomatic channels. The letter stated the consequences of an Iranian attempt to block the Strait of Hormuz and requested direct talks. Whether Iran agrees to talk remains to be seen. Certainly, the talks will be secret and low level unless they produce tangible benefits for both sides. How would a professional mediator approach these talks as a negotiator?
Understanding the interests of both the Iranian and American perspectives is a critical first step.
The Iranian government first and foremost wants to protect its power, position, and privilege from internal and external threats. The Shia Islamic regime sees as many threats from Sunni Islam as from the West. The Bush presidency handed Iran a rare opportunity to gather power and influence in the Middle East when Bush decided to topple Iran’s primary enemy, Sadaam Hussein. Since the overthrow of Hussein and his Baathist regime, Iran has increased its influence in Iraq through its support of the Iraqi Shia. Iran has an interest in preserving and increasing its influence over Iraqi politics. Likewise, Iran wishes to see the al Assad regime retain its power in Syria. Iran also wants to avoid a situation in which the United States, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, among others, decide to bring down the al Assad regime. To the east, Iran wishes to exert influence in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which are bordering countries.
In summary, the Iranian interests are regime preservation, increased political and economic influence in the region, and continued support of Shia Islamists. It does not want a war with the West.
American interests are likewise straightforward. America does not want oil supplies disrupted; it does not want failed states in the region to be sanctuaries for terrorists; it does not want a war with Iran; it does not want Islamic sectarian strife to widen or intensify; it wants stable political and economic regimes in oil producing countries; it would like to see governments in the region respect human rights more consistently; it would like to see Iran abandon nuclear weapons development. The US is or soon will be discussing peace with various Taliban elements as a prelude to exiting Afghanistan. Iran has levers it can pull in Afghanistan and Pakistan that could block those discussions. The US therefore does not want Iranian interference in talks with the Taliban.
Political realities will also influence these conversations. The initial representatives of both countries will not be high level policy makers. They will each have limited authority to make concessions and no authority to make binding agreements. Their conduct will be scrutinized by opposition elements in each country and subject to severe criticism. Thus, the early conversations will be conservative, confirmatory, and exploratory. They will be conservative because the domestic political realities will not permit a radical shift in the strategic relationship between Iran and America. They will be confirmatory as each side assesses whether their working hypotheses of each other’s interests are correct. They will be exploratory as each side tests for potential gains from continued discussions.
Negotiation style, modulated by culture, will also be an important element of preparation. The Iranians may at times demonstrate aggressive, threatening negotiating behaviors. The Iranian government wants to be respected and feared, internally and externally. National pride is significant, bringing the psychology of identity into the negotiation. American negotiators may be more linear and bottom line oriented. The negotiations might be something like rug merchant meets used car salesman. Frustration over negotiating styles should be anticipated. Preparing for a conflict in negotiation customs, methods, and styles will therefore be important.
Trust and accountability will also be an issue requiring preparation. When the value of what is being negotiated is well known and the exchange mechanisms are well-established, successful negotiations can occur with very little trust. In this negotiation there will be no easily determined valuation of interests and certainly no agreed upon exchange mechanism. Thus, trust becomes a central issue. How will each side assure itself that the other side will abide by agreements?
Similarly, the talks will have to occur secretly. However, one side or the other might see an opportunity to exploit the situation by talking to the media. Maintaining confidentiality will be a challenge.
This is a situation that calls for preparation, analysis, and role play rehearsal. The US representatives would be well-served to practice in simulated negotiation sessions that explore all of the challenges and roadblocks that might be anticipated with the Iranians. They should master a number of different negotiation processes including integrative as well as distributive processes. They should be psychologically prepared for any number of possible behaviors and have counter-tactics for each. They should be skilled at listening for what is being said and for paying close attention to what is not being said. Likewise, they should pay close attention to what they say, how they say it, and what they do not say.
These will not be mediated conversations. US-Iranian back-channel negotiations have a poor track record so there is no reason for optimism. However, conversations of any kind are better than silence and certainly better than war. The US can improve the chances of success by careful and thorough preparation of its representatives.

The assassination of Burhanuddin Rabbani, who was spearheading the reconciliation process with the Taliban in Afghanistan, has changed the dynamics of peace in Aghanistan. The Afghan government has evidence that the assassination, carried out by the Quetta Shura Taliban headed by Mullah Omar and based in Pakistan, was supported, encouraged, and perhaps financed by the ISI, the Pakistani Intelligence Service. The Pakistanis vehemently deny this charge. However, it would seem that Pakistani influence in Afghanistan is on a severe decline.

As a response to the assassination and the evidence linking it to the Pakistani intelligence service, the Afghanistan government has turned to India, seeking stronger ties and a reliable peace partner. This is infuriating and probably frightening the Pakistani military and intelligence service. The whole point of the Afghanistan adventure, from their perspective, was to de-stabilize the country, keep it in a low level of insurrection and civil war, and control the insurgents from Pakistan. They could thereby assure themselves that Afghanistan would not pose an existential threat on their western border. However, the continued duplicity that Pakistan has used as its chief strategy now seems to be backfiring. The US is tired of the lies, double-dealing, and outright deceptions carried out by the Pakistani military and intelligence service. This became apparent after Osama bin Laden was discovered living 750 yards from the Pakistani military academy and was assassinated by Seal Team 6. Now the Afghanistan government has turned against Pakistan as a direct result of Pakistan's involvement in the Rabbani assassination. Obviously, Pakistan is not a willing partner in the creation of a stable, neutral Pakistan and is beening ostracized from the process. What might this mean for a peace process?

First, any legitimate peace process will have to start inside of Afghanistan. No matter what any other country may wish, the Afghan people have to decide that they want peace, not war. This will by necessity be an internal process and therefore cannot be constrained by traditional 18th century diplomatic negotiations favored by the international foreign policy establishment. In other words, at the outset, there will be no high level peace talks between diplomats, envoys, and heads of state. 

Instead, if any peace process is to be effective and enduring, it must be organized and implemented from within Afghanistan. The stakeholders must include tribal leaders, village and regional councils (both shuras and jirgas), urban civil society leaders, women's rights leaders, government ministers, Pashtun, Tajik, Hazzari, and Uzbek ethnic representatives, and rule of law advocate, among others. The process must be carefully designed, fully funded, and organized by a mediation and facilitation team dedicated to a very long, arduous process. Lasting peace in Afghanistan will take 10-15 years to accomplish, not 6 months.

Second, the focus of the international community, especially the US, should be on supporting this internal process and protecting it from outside interference (e.g. from the Pakistanis and their Taliban proxies). Pakistan may be the major spoiler because peace is the last thing it wants to see in Afghanistan, unless it is in total control of the government. Pakistan and its Taliban proxies must be isolated and persuaded to stay out of the internal peace process.

Third, to the extent feasible, the NGOs and diplomats working in Afghanistan should be offering peace-related resources to the stakeholder groups. This could include referrals to mediation and facilitation experts, training in negotiation and mediation, training in effective group decision-making, and the myriad other skills needed in any difficult peace process. Building a systemic capacity for peace processes, negotiations, facilitated conversations, and restorative processes will be as important as the actual peace work itself. The US could divert a small percentage of its military spending in Afghanistan, which would be enough to support a robust peace process for the  generation that the process will probably take.

Finally, the international community should stay out of the way except to provide support and expert advice when asked. It should shelter the process, provide security as necessary in support of the process, and keep Pakistan at bay. Only when the Afghanistan people are speaking with one voice under a leadership regime that all trust to speak for their interests should the circle widen to include regional states.

This view of peace is very different from the usual trajectory of international peace efforts. It requires those who have power or think they have power to step back and allow for Afghanistan self-determination. At the same time, those who have power and are truly interested in peace can use their power to protect the process from outside spoilers. It means becoming a servant to peace instead of a master of war. It means putting the interests of the Afghanistan people ahead of national economic or security interests. It's unlikely that this dedication to peace exists in the international community. However, peace in Afghanistan is unlikely without it.

Douglas E. Noll is a professional mediator, author, and speaker. His latest book is Elusive Peace: How Modern Diplomatic Strategies Could Better Resolve World Conflicts.

The media will be paying close attention to the Palestinian bid for statehood because that bid sets up a classic human conflict of little guy against Big Guy, of justice vs. injustice, of self-determination and self-rule against opression and autocracy. Moreover, the US, which will oppose the Palestinian bid in the Security Council will be made to look as a power-mongering hypocrite. The media loves this because it sells newspapers and magazines.
However, the legal technicalities will probably escape media attention, and those technicalities are important.They are not that difficult to understand so here's a primer on the process.
First, there is a difference between statehood and membership in the UN. They are not the same thing. For instance, Taiwan is not a member of the UN, but it is a state. The Vatican is considered a state but it is not a member of the UN. Kosovo is considered a state by major powers, including the US and the EU, but it is not a member of the UN. Switzerland only joined the UN in 2002, but it was a state long before then. During the Cold War, many states had their application for membership at the UN vetoed (such as Ireland, Jordan, and some Soviet republics) but this did not mean that they were not states. So the Palestinians may be granted membership in the UN, but that does not confer statehood upon them.
This is complicated by the fact that international legal scholars do not agree on what "statehood" means. Neither the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) or the Montevideo Convention (1936) define the process of the creation of a nation-state. There are two terms used to described the formation of a nation-state: constitutitve and declarative. Constitutive means that a nation-state is recognized as such by other nation-states. Looks like a duck, walks, like a duck, quacks like a duck, must therefore be a duck. Declarative means that in addition to recognition, the nation-state must demonstrate independence from other authority, have defined geographical borders, a defined population, and control over the internal affairs within the borders and with the population. The declarative standard would be difficult for the Palestinians to establish.
All of this makes for good law review writing, but is politically meaningless. The reality is that an international consensus has to form around recognition of a nation-state. When the consensus has formed, there are legal procedures in place to codify the consensus into a legal reality. Without consensus, forming a new nation-state, e.g., Palestine, is impossible.
I should probably mention that consensus, in this context, means that all of the major military/economic powers agree generally on statehood. This is not a majority-rule situation, which is key to understanding the legal and political dynamics of the Palestinian situation. If one major power says no, there is no consensus, and nothing that is legally effective is likely to happen. And having said that, in the 21st century, wielding that kind of veto power may be politically very, very costly if the veto is against the sentiment of the rest of the world.
The process of seeking admission to the UN as a member starts with a formal letter from the leaders of the region seeking recognition as a nation-state to the UN secretary-general asking for acceptance as a full member to the United Nations. (See Rules 134-138) The letter has to include a declaration that the nation-state accepts the principles of the UN Charter. I've search the Internet to see if I could find a copy of any letter. So far, I have been unsuccessful. I don't think the letter has been delivered yet, which is interesting in its own right. Is this whole thing a negotiation ploy by the Palestinians? As a side note, one wonders how President Abbas can speak for Hamas in accepting the UN Charter on behalf of all Palestinians. Since Hamas is dedicated to the destruction of Israel, which would seem to be a violation of the UN Charter, its hard for me to see how the letter can legally be received as a good faith declaration of intent of all Palestinians. But that is a side issue.
When the UN secretary-general receives the letter, he is required to forward it to the current president of the Security Council, which in this case, is Germany. The president must convene a committee to study the request and submit a report to the UN Security Council.
The UN Security Council, upon receipt of the request and the report, debates the issue and votes to approve it or not. In this case, the US, bowing to Israeli political pressure, will veto the request.
If, by some miracle, the Security Council approved the request, the matter would be referred to the General Assembly where the request must be approved by a two-thirds vote. As of early September 2011, that vote would seem assured as 135 out of 196 members have indicated approval of membership for the Palestinians.
If the Security Council does not approve the request, the UN Assembly may pass a resolution approving the request, but the resolution has no force of law.
In essence, the Palestinian application for membership into the UN is a legally futile act. Politically, however, it may require the US to exercise veto power against the will of the vast majority of the members of the General Assembly in favor of Israel. One must wonder about the wisdom of that strategy from both the Israeli and the Palestinian perspective. The US, which is the largest, most significant financial supporter of both regimes, will be the biggest loser.
In summary, if the Palestinians apply for membership in the UN, they will fail. The process will polarize the US Congress in an election year. It will alienate Israel. It will leave the Obama Administration with yet another foreign policy mess. And, it will do nothing to change the status in the region. This looks like another dollar auction situation being played out by President Abbas against the advice of his senior advisors. (See my September 5, 2011 post Libya Needs a New Diplomacy for a description of The Dollar Auction.)
One last interesting point that has escaped the media's attention: If the Palestinians were admitted to membership in the UN, they would have access to the International Criminal Court. Cables released by Wikileaks seem to indicate that Israel considers this possibility, indictment of senior Israeli officials for crimes against humanity, a significant security threat such that Palestinian pursuit of an indictment would "constitute an act of war" against Israel. The existential and primal fear implied by this statement suggests that peace is a distant prospect in the region.