dougnoll’s posthaven

The assassination of Burhanuddin Rabbani, who was spearheading the reconciliation process with the Taliban in Afghanistan, has changed the dynamics of peace in Aghanistan. The Afghan government has evidence that the assassination, carried out by the Quetta Shura Taliban headed by Mullah Omar and based in Pakistan, was supported, encouraged, and perhaps financed by the ISI, the Pakistani Intelligence Service. The Pakistanis vehemently deny this charge. However, it would seem that Pakistani influence in Afghanistan is on a severe decline.

As a response to the assassination and the evidence linking it to the Pakistani intelligence service, the Afghanistan government has turned to India, seeking stronger ties and a reliable peace partner. This is infuriating and probably frightening the Pakistani military and intelligence service. The whole point of the Afghanistan adventure, from their perspective, was to de-stabilize the country, keep it in a low level of insurrection and civil war, and control the insurgents from Pakistan. They could thereby assure themselves that Afghanistan would not pose an existential threat on their western border. However, the continued duplicity that Pakistan has used as its chief strategy now seems to be backfiring. The US is tired of the lies, double-dealing, and outright deceptions carried out by the Pakistani military and intelligence service. This became apparent after Osama bin Laden was discovered living 750 yards from the Pakistani military academy and was assassinated by Seal Team 6. Now the Afghanistan government has turned against Pakistan as a direct result of Pakistan's involvement in the Rabbani assassination. Obviously, Pakistan is not a willing partner in the creation of a stable, neutral Pakistan and is beening ostracized from the process. What might this mean for a peace process?

First, any legitimate peace process will have to start inside of Afghanistan. No matter what any other country may wish, the Afghan people have to decide that they want peace, not war. This will by necessity be an internal process and therefore cannot be constrained by traditional 18th century diplomatic negotiations favored by the international foreign policy establishment. In other words, at the outset, there will be no high level peace talks between diplomats, envoys, and heads of state. 

Instead, if any peace process is to be effective and enduring, it must be organized and implemented from within Afghanistan. The stakeholders must include tribal leaders, village and regional councils (both shuras and jirgas), urban civil society leaders, women's rights leaders, government ministers, Pashtun, Tajik, Hazzari, and Uzbek ethnic representatives, and rule of law advocate, among others. The process must be carefully designed, fully funded, and organized by a mediation and facilitation team dedicated to a very long, arduous process. Lasting peace in Afghanistan will take 10-15 years to accomplish, not 6 months.

Second, the focus of the international community, especially the US, should be on supporting this internal process and protecting it from outside interference (e.g. from the Pakistanis and their Taliban proxies). Pakistan may be the major spoiler because peace is the last thing it wants to see in Afghanistan, unless it is in total control of the government. Pakistan and its Taliban proxies must be isolated and persuaded to stay out of the internal peace process.

Third, to the extent feasible, the NGOs and diplomats working in Afghanistan should be offering peace-related resources to the stakeholder groups. This could include referrals to mediation and facilitation experts, training in negotiation and mediation, training in effective group decision-making, and the myriad other skills needed in any difficult peace process. Building a systemic capacity for peace processes, negotiations, facilitated conversations, and restorative processes will be as important as the actual peace work itself. The US could divert a small percentage of its military spending in Afghanistan, which would be enough to support a robust peace process for the  generation that the process will probably take.

Finally, the international community should stay out of the way except to provide support and expert advice when asked. It should shelter the process, provide security as necessary in support of the process, and keep Pakistan at bay. Only when the Afghanistan people are speaking with one voice under a leadership regime that all trust to speak for their interests should the circle widen to include regional states.

This view of peace is very different from the usual trajectory of international peace efforts. It requires those who have power or think they have power to step back and allow for Afghanistan self-determination. At the same time, those who have power and are truly interested in peace can use their power to protect the process from outside spoilers. It means becoming a servant to peace instead of a master of war. It means putting the interests of the Afghanistan people ahead of national economic or security interests. It's unlikely that this dedication to peace exists in the international community. However, peace in Afghanistan is unlikely without it.

Douglas E. Noll is a professional mediator, author, and speaker. His latest book is Elusive Peace: How Modern Diplomatic Strategies Could Better Resolve World Conflicts.

If you liked Iraq and Afhganistan, you will love Somalia. I wonder what will be necessary for the elites in the diplomatic and international community to wake up to the fact that the system is not working. How many Rwandas, Bosnias, Iraqs, Afghanistans, and now Somalia, will it take to shift the way the world addresses deep conflicts and the crises that emmanate from them?
Somalia is a text book example of international failure. The warning signs for drought, famine, poverty, and death of tens of thousands of children have been well-known and documented for months, if not years. South-central Somalia is controlled by the militant semi-organization al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab is paranoid about international NGOs, and a year ago, banned aid agencies from helping the Somali people in that region. In southern Somalia, there is no government; no sense of any authority, except for al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab has no experience in managing humanitarian disasters because it is not truly a governmental organization.Nevertheless, al-Shabaab appeals to many Somalis, not because of an affinity for the radical Islamic goals of the organization, but because of economic and social interests. Like the Taliban in 1991, al-Shabaab ended the reign of the secular warlords. Unlike the Taliban, al-Shabaab has not been able to consolidate power or influence under a unified front. Its many factions only  unite against the Transitional Federal Government, another extraordinarily weak and ineffective organization. Other than the common enemy, it's every group for itself.
Even if NGOs could get in, daunting logistical problems exist. Only one port in the country is open to aid agencies, which is Mogadishu. Kismayo is not open because it is controlled by al-Shabaab. Port facilities are nonexistent; there is no machinery in place, and the port, roads, and transportation infrastructure has not been rehabilitated in the last twenty years. The region is full of checkpoints manned by local militias extorting money from anyone delivering food, water, and supplies to the people. Somalia is about as anarchic as a "country" can be.
The international system fails in this situation because it continues to make the false assumption that each nation is sovereign. Under the Treaty of Westphalia, each sovereign nation is represented by a "head of state" presumed to have the power to speak and negotiate with other "heads of state." Al-Shabaab is not cohesive; it is a string of loosely aligned factions. No "head of state" speaks for al-Shabaab. No one person speaks with one voice for al-Shabaab. The traditional model of diplomatic negotiation is simply not well-adapted to anarchy of this type.
So what should be done? If you want a radical solution that will surely offend most of the international community and politicians of all persuasions, have the UN Security Council declare Somalia a failed state and impose a UN Protectorate status on the country. It would be nice if the African Union endorsed this plan, but not essential. Bring in a powerful, well-funded, and well-trained UN military force with a broad mandate to restore order with force wihen necessary, followed by a civil service bureacracy to set up and run a government, an interim court system to establish the rule of law, humanitarian relief, health care, and education. Plan on a 20 to 30 year mission, maybe longer; hopefully shorter. Rebuild the country from the ground up, trying to be as sensitive to the cultural, clan, and tribal ties as possible. Fnd the best and brightest young people, educate them, and groom them as potential political and civil society leaders. Be prepared for resistance, push back, and localized terrorism. Don't have a timeframe and don't withdraw when the project becomes politically unpalatable. Deal with corruption quickly, making clear that it will not be tolerated. Teach people the essentials of nonviolent conflict resolution, leadership, and consensus-building, using as much of the indigenous knowledge as possible. Use common sense and compassion whenever possible in making decisions. Put smart people in place with full authority and don't second guess them. Insulate them from the inevitable influencers looking for personal advantage. Try not to make decsions based on the lowest political common denominator.
As a professional peacemaker, I can't see any other way out of the quagmire of Somalia. My nose wrinkles at the idea of nation-building (look at Iraq and Afghanistan), but what other options are there? If anyone has some, let me know.

Doug Noll, Lawyer Turned Peacemaker, is the author of Elusive Peace: How Modern Diplomatic Strategies Could Better Resolve World Conflicts.