Yemen, Protractive Conflicts, and Facilitating National Dialogue

Segment 1: Traversing Protractive Conflicts.  On this edition of The Doug Noll show we are speaking with Dr. Alma Abdul-Hadi Jadallah, President and Managing Director of Kommon Denominator (http://kommondenominator.com/), an award-winning woman owned firm dedicated to helping government, corporate, and community clients successfully navigate conflict and cultural. Dr. Abdul-Hadi Jadallah became interested in conflict resolution when she went back to school after raising a family. Additionally, moving to the U.S. and interacting in a multi-cultural society drew her attention to many issues: how people come together, how they interact, what kind of issues they are facing.

Protractive conflicts are characterized as conflicts that are stubborn and continue to happen. Their roots are usually in communities and between different ethnic groups. Yemen is an example of a protractive conflict. It is an internal conflict, primarily ethnic-driven, about the distribution of wealth, equality, the North vs the South, and corruption. There is a lot of violence.

Segment 2: A National Dialogue.  Dr. Abdul-Hadi Jadallah was invited with other experts to go to Yemen and help begin the process of peacemaking with the goal of designing and implementing a national dialogue. They brought in an international committee and started by thinking about what was needed to build a nation on equal rights and equitable resources. What kind of model should they follow? They put together nine working groups that looked at every facet of building a nation state. They mapped the groups and invited delegates to participate. Dr. Abdul-Hadi Jadallah found that this experience proved that dialog can always facilitate difficult conversation, particularly if there are good intentions and good will.

Segment 3: A Different Paradigm.  Dr. Abdul-Hadi Jadallah teaches courses on culture conflict and diversity to Masters and PhD students. She educates the students by giving them tools to analyze conflict, identify conflict, categorize conflict, design a process, and conduct an assessment. Her students see the value of understanding conflict analysis in their day-to-day lives and in the corporate world.

It takes time and effort to resolve a problem, which is a different paradigm. It takes a lot of introspection. Even the most innocent parties of the conflict play a role. Maybe they contributed to the escalation, or were too passive, or didn’t speak up. Additionally, it’s hard for the perpetrator to actually admit they had a role in hurting the other person.

Segment 4: Create a Safe Environment.  Even though peacemaking is well-intended, it can be taxing at times, both for the mediator and the parties involved. You see parts of you in them, and they see parts of them in you, which is difficult. It’s also hard to evaluate the results, although Dr. Abdul-Hadi Jadallah stresses what an opportunity it is to be able to sit across the table from the other side and start a dialogue. At the end of the day, the conflict is not the peacemaker’s conflict. The peacemaker merely creates a safe environment and a process to begin the conversation. To find out more about Dr. Alma Abdul-Hadi Jadallah and Kommon Deminator, visit http://kommondenominator.com/.

To listen to the entire interview:

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Syria, Unmasked

Segment 1: Syria’s Recent History. Our guest on this edition of The Doug Noll Show is Dr. James Paul. Dr. Paul is an independent scholar and consultant who served until recently as Executive Director of Global Policy Forum, an organization that monitors policy making at the United Nations. Paul is an expert on the UN Security Council and he wrote a book about Syria titled “Syria Unmasked.” He has been very active as a media commentator during the present crisis with Syria.

Dr. Paul points out that Syria is a very diverse country. It has a population of 23 million people, and is a modern country. Its people are well educated. It is a relatively secular country and not a land of religious extremists. After years of underground work that tried to move Syria toward a more democratic society, in the spring of 2011 there were protests. Many cities were involved and there was a crack-down by the government. There was a commitment to non-violence, but unfortunately some chose to take up arms. Almost immediately foreign arms and foreign fighters started to come into the country, which is now known as the rebel movement. This movement is particularly severe in the North. Over 100,000 people have now been killed and much of the infrastructure has been destroyed.

Segment 2: National Coordination Body and Jihadis. So how did Bashar Assad, the President of Syria, became head of the regime? Dr. Paul said it was a family matter. The military and political people surrounding the Assad family are very powerful and are calling the shots.

There are two currents within Syria and the biggest, the National Coordination Body, is non-violent. The National Coordination Body started the protests in 2011, and many of the leaders have been exiled for years. On the military side the dominant force is the Jihadis. They are the sphere carriers for the entire military campaign, and many of them are foreigners.

Segment 3: Russia’s Involvement. Dr. Paul says the main hope among the non-violent Syrians is that there will be a Peace Conference. Historically the US administration has not been interested in connecting with the non-violent Syrians. They are interested in the armed rebellion because it would essentially lead them to be able (more or less) to install their friends in a new government. They believe they are headed toward a military victory, although Dr. Paul thinks it’s difficult to see how a military victory could be had.

As far as Russia is concerned, we are on dangerous ground. The last great use of chemical weapons was in the Iran-Iraq war and the United States itself provided the chemical weapons precursors to Suddam Hussein. The U.S. is up to its ears in responsibility.

Segment 4: Preserve the State. So what is likelihood that the non-violent opposition will be able to form a different kind of civil society in Syria? It depends on the way the current government is pushed out. It could be very chaotic. It would be best if there was an international agreement as to the various stages of a slow transition. We need to think about how to make the transition in such a way that preserves the institutions. There is no reason for a failed state in Syria. They need to preserve the state; this has to be a priority.

To listen to the entire interview:

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War: The Systematic Erosion of Civil Liberties

Segment 1: The Center of Peace and Liberty

From Afghanistan and Pakistan to Iran and Israel, crises are flourishing today. On this edition of The Doug Noll show we will be talking about the world conflicts that exist today and our own country’s history with war and conflict. Our guest is Dr. Ivan Eland, Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace and Liberty at the Independent Institute (www.independent.org). Ivan spent 15 years working for congress in various capacities before getting into the Think Tank world. The Center on Peace and Liberty studies war, civil liberties and freedom. Through research they have shown that much of the erosion of civil liberties and loss of freedom in the United States’ history has occurred because of war. When our country has a crisis and the government puts anti-liberties regulation in place, it’s very difficult to remove the legislation, even when we have a liberal president in office.

 

Segment 2: A Standard Pattern

The slogan “the best defense is a good offense” is fine for conventional warfare but for terrorism it’s just the opposite. A strong offense with terrorism usually just creates more terrorism. Getting Bin Laden was important because we decimated the al-Qaeda leadership, but Ivan thinks that we should’ve stopped there, instead of going into Somalia, Pakistan and the Arabian Peninsula. We’re making more enemies. There is a standard pattern with terrorists: once they hit their opponent, they hope that the opponent will overreact, which enables them to gain more funding and recruits.

 

Segment 3: The Most Aggressive Country on the Planet

In regards to Syria, whenever a country is in a civil war it’s very chaotic. We don’t have good intelligence in Syria about “who’s radical and who’s not” so if we send heavier weapons to Syria we risk having terrorists get their hands on them. There’s only been one war in U.S. history (the War of 1812) that has not had dire political repercussions. Obama has been cautious to get into war. Romney has pressure to ramp up the volume of weapon sales to the rebels. For most of our history we’ve run a restrained foreign policy, but it started eroding with the Spanish-American war, then we hit WWI and WWII and after WWII we are the king nation and the super power. We became the most aggressive country on the planet. We need to retreat from our overly-interventionist policy. This does not make us isolationists. Every problem in the world does not need to be solved by the U.S. We can’t afford it, financially or otherwise.

 

Segment 4: Imperial Overextension

The policy of intervention has held up thus far because the military industrial complex is alive and well. To cut back on military spending would put a lot of people out of work. So how do we change the course of this country? We need to reconfigure our military into a more defensive profile. Our economy is stagnant but our military budget is growing fast, which brings about imperial overextension.  We could save a lot of money if the defense department did what it was supposed to do and the constitution provided for the common defense instead of the common offense. We have been the most aggressive country in the world by far, and historically war is the central cause of big government.

 

To listen to the complete interview:

 

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The Mystery of Vladimir Putin

Segment 1: Vladimir Putin, Revealed.

Many would argue that Vladimir Putin, the president of Russia, is moving the country away from democracy and back toward authoritarian rule. Putin has supported the Al-Assad regime in Syria, despite evidence of mass human rights violations. He has also supported Iran by blocking UN Security Council resolutions aimed at crippling Iran's nuclear program.

 

Our guest on this edition of The Doug Noll Show, Jennifer Ciotta, explains what makes Vladimir Putin tick. Jennifer is the author of I, Putin, which won Honorable Mentions at the New York Book Festival & Hollywood Book Festival, 2012. She was a Peace Corps volunteer in the former Soviet republic of Estonia for two years and holds a Master’s degree in creative writing and Russian studies from the Gallatin School at New York University.

 

Jennifer’s interest in Russia started in 2000 when she graduated from college and went into the Peace Corp in Estonia. After the tragic Kursk explosion in August of 2000 and Russia’s decision not to accept rescue offers from neighboring countries, Jennifer wanted to find out why Putin reacted the way he did.

 

Segment 2: The Kursk: A Defining Moment.

In Jennifer’s book, I, Putin, we find out that Putin is a Judo black belt. Judo shaped him tremendously as an individual and he is mentally, physically and spiritually tough. The Kursk explosion was Putin’s first defining moment, as he had only been in power for three months and the event transpired before the Moscow Theater Siege in 2002 and the Chechen Hostage tragedy in 2004. When the explosion happened we saw him take control of the media and reveal his strength as a leader. Jennifer tells us that to really understand Russia we need to know that they view democracy differently than we view democracy. They want a strong, authoritarian leader and Putin is that person.

 

Segment 3: Putin’s Image.

Jennifer believes Pussy Riot, the Russian feminist punk rock band from Moscow, made a very disrespectful demonstration choice but the 2-year sentence to a penal colony was severe and extreme. Russia still doesn’t have “free speech” in the same sense that we have it in the United States. This is a society that values control and order over more liberal civil rights. It’s Putin’s Russia. He does not care what the West thinks about him, but he does care about his image in Russia.

 

Syrian ties to Russia and the Soviet Union go back a long time. Jennifer says Russia has a deep vested interest in Syria for five reasons: lucrative arms sales, deep-water ports for naval influence, fears of Syrian destabilization, Russian’s natural resource interest, and Putin’s view of sovereignty (each country has authority over itself).

 

Segment 4: Putin’s Real Motivation: Oil and Money.

The current foreign policy in Russia is basically “do what you want, don’t bother us and we won’t bother you.” Putin’s definition of sovereignty might be old school but what really motivates him is oil and money. When Putin started in 2000, oil was $27 a barrel, today it is $94 a barrel. If that price drops, the economic and political situation will not be a pretty for Putin.

 

To listen to the complete interview:

 

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The Collapse of Syria

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In a past blog, I predicted the failure of Kofi Anan's mediation efforts. This was no magical feat on my part. Anyone with an once of experience in mediation could see that Mr. Anan was the wrong person at the wrong time with the wrong skills for the job. While he is a famous international diplomat, he is not and never has been a trained, professional mediator. That became apparent as he violated mediation principle after principle during his tenure. His resignation, accompanied by a public statement excoriating the international community, was more of a reflection of how he misread and misunderstood the conflict than about the political will of the UN Security Council.

What now? Clearly, a negotiated peace between the Assad regime and the opposition forces is unlikely. Iran and Russia have publicly supported the Assad regime and cannot gracefully retreat without significant loss of international prestige. For the Iranians, in particular, that is unacceptable. Thus, the conflict will have to play out to the end with Bashar al Assad being deposed or running for asylum. His mindset is unfortunately locked into a belief structure that will not allow him to see reality. Hence, he is as likely to be killed in office as to retire from it.

If anyone is thinking in the international community, they should be planning on how to prevent all out chaos and anarchy in Syria post-Assad. With the removal of the Alawites from power, there will a vacuum crying to be filled. A host of interests are eager to rush in, including Shiite fundamentalists, Sunni fundamentalists, al Queda-affiliated forces, and the Muslim Brotherhood. The Syrian people are not experienced in the tug and pull of democracy, do not have a strong civil society, and do not have foundational institutions to allow for a free society. These all have to be built from scratch. At the same time, the bureaucracy has to remain functional to provide basic services. Hopefully, the world learned that lesson from Iraq and Libya.

If mediators can assist at all, they will work on the inevitable conflicts arising in the opposition forces and help the various factions form political coalitions that approach independent self-determination.  This is messy, difficult work. Once the common enemy, Bashar al Assad, is gone, the glue holding together the opposition will melt away. Finding common purpose in a peaceful, nonviolent transition to an appropriate form of government will be very challenging. It will take courageous, visionary Syrian leadership to guide the people.

In addition, the internal factions will face the prospect of dealing with outside spoilers. Those spoilers could include Russia and Iran, looking to maintain and perhaps strengthen their influence in the new Syria. The US and European powers could also be spoilers if they see disadvantage to a truly independent, self-determinative Syria. The Kurds are also a wild card, and may negate Turkey's potentially positive influence on the Syrian outcome. The only way the outside power players can be thwarted is if the Syrian factions unite against outside interference. This poses a classic Prisoner's Dilemma situation for the Syrian factions as the decision to defect from cooperation with other factions may appear more attractive than agreeing to cooperate and facing the possibility of exploitation. Again, mediators might be able to facilitate the decision making process towards cooperation and away from self-interested choices that will ultimately defeat a peaceful Syria.

The experiences in the Middle East over the past 10 years should inform us all that classic international power politics is more likely to generate war than peace. The international powers certainly are not oriented to stability. Instead, they continue to joust for influence by thwarting each other's ambitions and interests. Thus, if the Syrian people want peace and self-determination they will need the discipline to turn away from the power inducements of the west or of Russia and Iran. They will have to turn inward and solve their own problems in their own way. They can do this with the help of skilled mediators. Time will tell if that is the path they choose.

Suicide, Adaptation and Survival Within a War Zone

Segment 1: The Human Cost

Besides the enormous financial deficit that the Iraqi war and military operations in Afghanistan have caused the U.S., the human cost has been astronomical. In 2012, according to a recent Pentagon study, there has been one military suicide each day. On average 19 veterans commit suicide each day, with the majority being 18-29 years old. These suicide stats need to be addressed.

 

Our guest on this edition of The Doug Noll show is Bob Rail. Bob is the author of Surviving the International War Zone: Security Lessons Learned and Stories from Police and Military Peacekeeping Forces. After an extensive street law enforcement career, Bob became an International Police Officer for the U.N. in Bosnia and Kosovo, and designed curriculums for police officers from 60 nations all over the world.  Bob’s website is www.robertrail.com.

 

Doug asks Bob to reflect on the adaptation challenges, both going into a war zone and returning from one. Bob says that the human being is an incredible biomechanical machine which can adapt to anything. When you’re in a war zone you either adapt or die. The penalty for not adapting is complete. However, it’s difficult to unadapt. Veterans from WW2 still have times when they can’t eat certain foods or smell certain smells.

 

Segment 2: The War Zone Habit

When you’re going to a war zone, you have to adapt quickly to a very dangerous environment. Bob believes the military does an outstanding job of training our people to go to war, but when they come back, they come back ALONE. A war zone is a habit; you can’t just shut it off. The danger factor alone creates an intense bonding experience within your team. When you’re in dangerous situations your team becomes your family. You speak casually with your colleagues in a war zone about things you would never speak about with anyone else.

 

Segment 3: The Reentry Experience

To help a young person coming back from a war zone to readapt, recognize that the person who went away is not the person who came home. Listen to them. Some serious warning signs are: if you’re engaged in a conversation and they stop talking and shut down, if they sit in a dark room for hours at a time, or if they start giving away special items like jewelry or watches. Don’t let them shut down and retreat within. Intervention hotlines are available and there are a lot of people who can help, but the problem is making the connection. Those of us who have not gone through the reentry experience have no clue about the pain and the challenges that the people returning from the war zone have. We become intensely judgmental.

 

Segment 4: Current Kosovo

Regarding Syria and the UN monitoring force there currently, Bob thinks it’s an impossible job and that there is not going to be a solution if they stay on their current path. They are in over their heads and untrained. Kosovo will self-destruct. Instead of the UN bringing a homogenized society together they established a political duality with two elected officials. This will not work. They want a war and they don’t outside interference.

 

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Meditation in Syria-MIssion Improbable

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As a professional mediator, I am always encouraged by the use of mediation to resolve international conflicts. However, in the case of Syria, I have little confidence that mediation will bring peace to the conflict. Very few of the essential elements for successful mediation are present in this conflict.

The first consideration in convening any mediation is deciding who the parties at the table will be. In this case, the current Syrian government will certainly be a party. However, there does not appear to be a credible spokesperson for the rebels. One of the reasons that international support has not coalesced in support of the rebels like it did in Libya is because the rebels have not proven themselves capable of creating a coherent political force. Since mediation is about decision-making, we have to ask the question: "Who has the power to make binding decisions for the parties?" Obviously, the Syrian government can make decisions. Who, in the rebel group, can make binding decisions for the people that oppose the al Assad regime?

The Syrian National Council claims authority for the resistance against the al Assad regime. Burhan Galioun, a professor of political sociology at the Universite de Paris III Sorbonne University, was appointed as head of the SNC on August 29, 2011. However, Professor Galioun has made statements that are not universally shared by the various rebel factions. It is unlikely that either he or the Syrian National Council speaks for all factions.

One of the issues that plagues peaceful resolution of internal conflicts and civil wars is decision-making authority. It's one thing to mediate a dispute in a contested presidential election, when the disputants are easily recognized as political opponents. It's another thing altogether to mediate the dispute the between a fractious rebel group and an antagonistic government. The al Assad regime can rightfully ask by what authority to the representatives of the rebels come to the table? Any mediator taking on the Syrian problem will spend a considerable amount of time answering that question, and the entire enterprise will collapse if it is not answered thoroughly.

A related issue has to do with legitimizing the antagonists. In the 1970s, the protracted negotiations over the shapes of the tables and who would sit where in the US North Vietnam talks was about legitimizing primary parties at the table. In Syria’s case, the al Assad regime could protest participation of rebel representatives because allowing participation would confer unwanted legitimacy. At the outset, the mediator will have to be prepared to deal with challenges to legitimate participation by primary parties.

The people of Syria have the most at stake in any mediated talks. The mediator will have to consider how to make sure that the legitimate concerns of the people, which will include social and distributive injustices, political inclusion, economic reform, safety from violence and social stability. In this regard, the mediator may consider finding civil society representatives, including women, to participate as direct and primary participants. The mediator will have to secure the consent of the rebel representatives and the government representatives to share decision-making power with civil society representatives who otherwise would not have a voice in the process.

In addition to primary parties, mediation involves secondary parties. In the case of Syria, the secondary parties are numerous. They include Hamas, Iran, Russia and China, the US, Israel, and the EU, the Arab League, the UN, the Muslim Brotherhood, Sunni Arab nations such as Saudi Arabia, and other conservative Islamic groups. All of these parties have vested and conflicting interests in the outcome of the Syrian conflict. All of these parties wish to influence the outcome to benefit their particular interests. They will be seeking direct participation at the table. If they are denied participation of the table, they will seek to influence the process in other ways, including as spoilers. The mediator will have to design a process that provides for secondary party participation and inclusion, but does not permit undue interference in the direct talks between the primary parties.

Assuming that agreements can be reached upon who will participate in the process, the mediator will be confronted with what is to be mediated. The superficial answer will be to mediate a political solution to the violence. However, that is grossly insufficient to bring about a lasting peace. As we have seen in Kenya, the superficial political solution has led to continued gross economic and social injustice, continued tribal conflict, and the essential shutdown of an effective government. The Sentinel Project observes that Kenya is ripe for genocide. (http://thesentinelproject.org/wp-content/uploads/Risk-Assessment-Kenya-2011.pdf). I believe this is a direct result of the failure of the mediator to force Odinga and Kibaki to address serious structural injustices instead choosing to seek superficial political solutions through an ineffective and unworkable power-sharing arrangement.

The same problem exists in Syria, except that it is worse. Rather than mediating a contested presidential election, the mediator will have to end a civil war and deal with generations of abuse, injustice, and human rights violations. Burhan Ghalioun, the appointed head of the Syrian National Council, is skeptical of dialogue with the al Assad regime. “The regime is not interested in or willing to meet the requirements of a meaningful dialogue,” Ghalioun wrote. The opposition cannot join dialogue with “officials who contributed to or ordered the killing of defenseless children, women, and young people.” He has said that dialogue would be fruitless unless the clear objective was “to dismantle the regime of repression, oppression, and tyranny and replace it with a democratic order in which the people alone have the final say and the government is fully empowered and answerable to elected representatives of the people.”

Ghalioun believes that “dialogue should not mean a deal with the regime. It must not be about broadening the circle of participation” to members of the authorities; rather “it must be about a timetable for a transition to democracy by peaceful means, in the hope of avoiding more human casualties and material losses, and creating the necessary conditions for new institutions to be built and function properly.” To Ghalioun, the government leaders “lost their legitimacy” when they unleashed bloody violence against peaceful protesters.

From these statements, it is clear that if the mediator seeks a superficial political solution through power-sharing, without forcing the parties to confront the centuries old conflicts between the Alawites, the Sunnis, and the Syrian minorities, the mediation will make the situation worse, not better.

Thus, the mediator will be well advised to discuss what is to be mediated and to explore the potential range of outcomes that will be satisfactory to all of the participants. This exploration by itself will be time-consuming and exhausting as it will consist of a negotiation over what is to be negotiated. However, that is the work of the mediator and is to be anticipated and planned for.

Finally, does the mediator have the staying power that the Syrian mediation will require? In the Kenyan election crisis, the mediator abandoned the mediation process after six weeks and turned it over to another mediator who abandoned the process six weeks after that. There was no long-term plan for engagement and no plan for helping the parties resolve ongoing differences and conflicts. Will the mediator in the Syrian conflict be committed to the years it may take to bring peace to Syria? This is not a six week or six-month engagement. The intractability of the dispute and the ongoing violence suggests that a mediated negotiation might last for years. Even then, success will be problematic.

International conflict mediation has not been typified by exemplary mediation practice. Instead, most international conflict mediations have been ad hoc affairs conducted by diplomats and political envoys with little or no experience in decision making theory, conflict theory, neuro social psychology, behavioral economics, and a host of other disciplines that modern mediators study and practice. The Syrian conflict will call upon the deepest skills and reserves of the very best mediator. Even then, a peaceful resolution is improbable. I hope that the mediator considers some of these issues before he starts his work.

 

 

Douglas E. Noll is author of the award-winning book Elusive Peace: How Modern Diplomatic Strategies Could Better Resolve World Conflicts (Prometheus Books 2011). He may reached through the book website, www.elusivepeace.com.

Negotiating with the Iranians-A Primer

In early January 2012, the Obama administration sent a letter to the Iranian government through diplomatic channels. The letter stated the consequences of an Iranian attempt to block the Strait of Hormuz and requested direct talks. Whether Iran agrees to talk remains to be seen. Certainly, the talks will be secret and low level unless they produce tangible benefits for both sides. How would a professional mediator approach these talks as a negotiator?
Understanding the interests of both the Iranian and American perspectives is a critical first step.
The Iranian government first and foremost wants to protect its power, position, and privilege from internal and external threats. The Shia Islamic regime sees as many threats from Sunni Islam as from the West. The Bush presidency handed Iran a rare opportunity to gather power and influence in the Middle East when Bush decided to topple Iran’s primary enemy, Sadaam Hussein. Since the overthrow of Hussein and his Baathist regime, Iran has increased its influence in Iraq through its support of the Iraqi Shia. Iran has an interest in preserving and increasing its influence over Iraqi politics. Likewise, Iran wishes to see the al Assad regime retain its power in Syria. Iran also wants to avoid a situation in which the United States, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, among others, decide to bring down the al Assad regime. To the east, Iran wishes to exert influence in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which are bordering countries.
In summary, the Iranian interests are regime preservation, increased political and economic influence in the region, and continued support of Shia Islamists. It does not want a war with the West.
American interests are likewise straightforward. America does not want oil supplies disrupted; it does not want failed states in the region to be sanctuaries for terrorists; it does not want a war with Iran; it does not want Islamic sectarian strife to widen or intensify; it wants stable political and economic regimes in oil producing countries; it would like to see governments in the region respect human rights more consistently; it would like to see Iran abandon nuclear weapons development. The US is or soon will be discussing peace with various Taliban elements as a prelude to exiting Afghanistan. Iran has levers it can pull in Afghanistan and Pakistan that could block those discussions. The US therefore does not want Iranian interference in talks with the Taliban.
Political realities will also influence these conversations. The initial representatives of both countries will not be high level policy makers. They will each have limited authority to make concessions and no authority to make binding agreements. Their conduct will be scrutinized by opposition elements in each country and subject to severe criticism. Thus, the early conversations will be conservative, confirmatory, and exploratory. They will be conservative because the domestic political realities will not permit a radical shift in the strategic relationship between Iran and America. They will be confirmatory as each side assesses whether their working hypotheses of each other’s interests are correct. They will be exploratory as each side tests for potential gains from continued discussions.
Negotiation style, modulated by culture, will also be an important element of preparation. The Iranians may at times demonstrate aggressive, threatening negotiating behaviors. The Iranian government wants to be respected and feared, internally and externally. National pride is significant, bringing the psychology of identity into the negotiation. American negotiators may be more linear and bottom line oriented. The negotiations might be something like rug merchant meets used car salesman. Frustration over negotiating styles should be anticipated. Preparing for a conflict in negotiation customs, methods, and styles will therefore be important.
Trust and accountability will also be an issue requiring preparation. When the value of what is being negotiated is well known and the exchange mechanisms are well-established, successful negotiations can occur with very little trust. In this negotiation there will be no easily determined valuation of interests and certainly no agreed upon exchange mechanism. Thus, trust becomes a central issue. How will each side assure itself that the other side will abide by agreements?
Similarly, the talks will have to occur secretly. However, one side or the other might see an opportunity to exploit the situation by talking to the media. Maintaining confidentiality will be a challenge.
This is a situation that calls for preparation, analysis, and role play rehearsal. The US representatives would be well-served to practice in simulated negotiation sessions that explore all of the challenges and roadblocks that might be anticipated with the Iranians. They should master a number of different negotiation processes including integrative as well as distributive processes. They should be psychologically prepared for any number of possible behaviors and have counter-tactics for each. They should be skilled at listening for what is being said and for paying close attention to what is not being said. Likewise, they should pay close attention to what they say, how they say it, and what they do not say.
These will not be mediated conversations. US-Iranian back-channel negotiations have a poor track record so there is no reason for optimism. However, conversations of any kind are better than silence and certainly better than war. The US can improve the chances of success by careful and thorough preparation of its representatives.

Something Strange About Compassion for Syria

A month ago I wrote a blog entitled "Is Syria Suffering from a Family Business Conflict?" Because it was a different take on what the mainstream media was reporting, I submitted it to the Huffington Post as well as posting it on my blog sites. I have been a Huff Post blogger for several years and have always found the editorial staff to be professional and reasonably fast in posting my blogs. Not this time. Without a word, my blog disappeared into the maw of the Huffington Post, never to be approved for posting. I wrote several times, wondering what the problem was. Maybe they lost it? Finally, having received no response, I decided that the content was not to the liking of the editorial staff, and they just decided not to publish it. No big deal, but it made me wonder about AOL's editorial control of what was once a free-spirited blog site.

I talked about my analysis of the Assad family and the internal conflicts I thought it might be suffering to friends and family. My mother-in-law was so intrigued that she suggested I submit the piece to the New York Times Op-Ed section. I declined. It wasn't that good or brilliant.

Then I ran across another interesting tidbit. A Vogue Magazine feature of Asma al-Assad, wife of Bashar, was removed from the Vogue website. Max Fisher, an associates editor at The Atlantic reported in the online Atlantic magazine on January 3, 2012  that:

"In February, Vogue magazine published, for the benefit of its 11.7 million readers, an article titled "A Rose in the Desert" about the first lady of Syria. Asma al-Assad has British roots, wears designer fashion, worked for years in banking, and is married to the dictator Bashar al-Assad, whose regime has killed over 5,000 civilians and hundreds of children this year. The glowing article praised the Assads as a "wildly democratic" family-focused couple who vacation in Europe, foster Christianity, are at ease with American celebrities, made theirs the "safest country in the Middle East," and want to give Syria a "brand essence."

Vogue's editors defended the controversial article as "a way of opening a window into this world a little bit," conceding only that Assad's Syria is "not as secular as we might like." A senior editor responsible for the story told me the magazine stood by it. A few weeks later, the article and all references to it were removed from Vogue's website without explanation. In August, The Hill reported that U.S. lobbying firm Brown Lloyd James had been paid $5,000 per month by the Syrian government to arrange for and manage the Vogue article."

Fishder provided a link to the article that is still up at a site called presidentalassad.net. You can read the original Vogue article here.

Go read the Vogue article and then read my blog. Then think about what is happening in Syria. There is no question that the government is brutally suppressing resistance. But is this because of Bashar al-Assad, despite him, or is he just a figure head for his brother and brother-in-law? I don't know. However, It is curious that my post, which provided space for compassion for Bashar al-Assad, was not published by the Huffington Post and the Vogue piece, which was flattering to Asma al-Asssad, Bashar's wife, was removed. Coincidence is the probable explanation. But curious nonetheless.

Is Syria Suffering From a Family Business Conflict?

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As a professional peacemaker, I tend to look at conflicts from the perspective of the people instead of politics. In the process of mediating thousands of conflicts, large and small, I find that conflict dynamics tend to fall into predictable patterns. This is especially true in family business conflicts. The same themes arise over and over again such that the conflict dynamics are predictable and systematic.

 While reading about the Syrian uprising some months ago, I read a brief mention of President Bashar al-Assad's younger brother, Maher. Maher, as it turns out, controls the military and is apparently the one responsible for the violent oppression of the protesters. I had wondered about that because Bashar was trained as medical doctor--an opthamologist---with no interest in politics or power until he was recalled to Syria by his father, the late Hafez al-Assad. So why would a western-trained physician married to a British-born Syrian woman who was a Citibank investment banker, lead his country into civil war? It began to sound like a classic family business conflict. When I started digging, I found all of the elements that I routinely see in deep conflicts. Of course, this is all highly speculative as I have never met the Assads or anyone that knows them. However, the superficial parallels to the trajectory of a family business suggest that the Syrian civil war is the result of an on-going, essentially unresolved, family business conflict.

 Here's the analysis I have constructed from the public records.

 The Family Business Founder

 Hafez al Assad assumed power in Syria, founding the family business. He essentially forced a buyout in a bloodless military coup in November 1970 as he capitalized on  internal conflict between the Baath Party’s more moderate military wing and more extremist civilian wing. Like any family business founder, he established an authoritarian regime with power concentrated in his own hands. His thirty-year presidency was characterized by a cult of personality, developed in order to maintain control over a potentially restive population and to provide cohesion and stability to the government. This management approach to government, while creating stability and wealth for the family, came at a cost. Dissent was harshly eliminated, the most extreme example being the brutal suppression in February 1982 of the Muslim Brotherhood. Moreover, the country’s economy suffered, and progress was hindered by an overstaffed and inefficient public sector run overwhelmingly according to Baath Party dictates.

 From the founder's perspective, however, all was well. Hafez had three sons, Basil, Bashar, and Maher, and a daughter Bushra. As is typical in many family businesses, the oldest son Basil, was crowned as the successor and heir-apparent.

 From a young age, Basil was groomed to be the next president of Syria. He was chief of presidential security while running a highly publicized anti-corruption campaign within the regime, and frequently appeared in full military uniform at official receptions, signaling the regime's commitment to the armed forces. He also had a reputation for driving fast cars and living a faster life.

 The Succession Plan Goes Awry

 In January 1994, driving his Mercedes at high speed through fog to Damascus International Airport  Basil crashed into a motorway roundabout and died instantly. The succession plan was just thrown out the window, and with it the seeds of future conflict were sown into the soil of Syria. Basil was sometimes referred to as "Basil the Martyr", and numerous squares and streets have been named after him. His statue is found in several Syrian cities, and even after his death he is often pictured at billboards with his father and brother. Thus, in his death, he continues to symbolize the aspirations of his late father.

 The Physician Turned Dictator

 Unlike his brothers, Basil and Maher, and his sister, Bushra, Bashar al-Assad was quiet and reserved. Bashar had no interest in politics or the military and, until Basil's death, never talked about politics with his father.

 Bashar excelled during his primary and secondary education in the Arab-French al-Hurriya School in Damascus. In 1982, he graduated from high school and studied medicine at Damascus University. In 1988, he graduated from medical school and began working as an army doctor in Syria's biggest military hospital. Four years later, he went to the United Kingdom for postgraduate training in ophthalmology. Bashar became fluent in French and English, and while in London, met and married a Syrian-born British investment banker. At the time, Bashar had few political aspirations and looked destined to have a normal professional career as a second son of a political leader. Thus, to his surprise, he was recalled in 1994 to join the Syrian army, after Basil's unexpected death. Without his consent, he had been appointed by his father as the family successor.

 Over the next six and half years, until his death in 2000, Hafez groomed Bashar for power. To establish his military credentials, Bashar entered the military academy at Homs. He was fast-tracked to colonel in five years. To consolidate the military power base for Bashar, old divisional commanders were retired and replaced with young Alawite officers loyal to the family. In public affairs, Bashar was granted wide powers. He became a political adviser to his father, was head of the bureau to receive complaints and appeals of citizens, and led a campaign against corruption.

 Hafez al Assad died in 2000. The Syrian parliament immediately passed a law reducing the qualifying age for president from 40 to 34 and unanimously affirmed Bashar as president. In a general referendum, Bashar received 97 percent approval from the Syrian public.

 The Younger Brother-Power Behind the Throne?

 Maher al-Assad, Bashar's youngest brother, was born on December 8, 1967. Like his brothers and sisters, he was raised out of the public spotlight. Maher went to the Academy of Freedom School for his secondary education and studied business at Damascus University. After graduation, he pursued a career in the military. When Basil died, Maher was considered as a possible successor to Hafez. Maher's reputation as hot-tempered perhaps influenced Hafez's decision to appoint Bashar as heir to the family business.

 

 After Basil's death, Maher assumed command of a brigade in the Republican Guard and distinguished himself as a good commander. His time as brigade commander allowed him to gain valuable military experience and build personal ties with his officers. After the death of his father in 2000, he was promoted from major to lieutenant colonel. and became commander of the Republican Guard. The Republican Guard is a 10,000 strong unit whose loyalty is said to be guaranteed by the revenue it receives from the Deir ez-Zor oil fields. Maher also became commander of the army's elite Fourth Armored Division.

 In June 2000, Maher was elected to the ruling Baath Party's central committee.

 Maher  has been alleged to be deeply involved in many corrupt schemes. According to Fortune Magazine, Maher benefited from the billion dollar money laundering operation at the Lebanese al-Madina bank. Al-Madina was used to launder kickback money of Iraqi officials and their partners in  illegal profiteering from the UN's oil-for-food program. Sources put the amount laundered through al-Madina at more than $1 billion, with a 25 percent commission going to Syrian officials, including Maher.

 Maher has often appeared in public with Bashar and is said to be one of his closest advisers.

 Maher, along with his brother-in-law General Assef Shawqat, who is married to sister Bushra, and Bashar are said to form the inner circle of power in the Assad regime. Shawqat was the former head of intelligence.

 Since the beginning of the Syrian uprising in mid-March, Maher's troops have played a key role in violently suppressing protests in the southern city of Daraa, the coastal city of Banias, the central province of Homs and the northern province of Idlib.

 The United States imposed sanctions on Maher for human rights violations in Syria. The EU sanctioned Maher for being the principal overseer of violence against demonstrators during the 2011 Syrian uprising.

Conflict Over Direction of the Family Business

 As I noted above, father's governance of the family business was characterized by stability and centralized rule based on his personal authority. Bashar, faced with the difficulties of his time, chose to lead ‘his’ Syria in a different direction. These ‘plans’ for a regime change received wide attention under the metaphor ‘Damascus Spring’ and included broad economic and political reforms. It was a period of high optimism among the Syrians: the period saw the emergence of some seventy ‘dialogue clubs’ for discussions between Syria’s civil society and its political elites - opposition parties played an active role in this period - and two private magazines, Ad-Dumari and Al-Iqtisadiyya, began operations. Bashar had great liberalizing plans as indicated by his inaugural speech to the nation on July 17, 2000.

 His plans were short-lived, however. Maher, apparently incensed at the loss of power, position, and privilege a liberalized Syria would mean, eventually convinced Bashar to back away. Bashar quickly learned that he was surrounded by men who ascended to power under the old patronage system. They were inclined not to give up their power to the masses.

 Resolution

 The US-led invasion of Iraq ended the Damascus Spring as the Syrian elites feared liberalization would destroy their power, position, and privilege.  Bashar probably was moved away from his personal inclinations by a complex calculus that included his sense of obligation and loyalty to his father and family, his belief that Maher as his replacement would be a real tyrant, his thought that he could play a moderating force on the extreme elements of the Syrian leadership, concern for his personal safety and security and that of his family, and protection of his personal position, privilege, and power. As a result, he acceded to his brother's advice and allowed the government to clamp down again on dissent, liberalization, and creation of a civil society based on the rule of law.

 The decision led to another 10 years of relative stability in Syria. However, the oppression of the Sunni majority, the continued corruption, and the absence of economic opportunity for young Syrians created the same dynamic as was seen in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. In this case, however, the family's business partners, Russia, China, and Iran, have provided shelter from the rest of the international community. Civil war has been the result.

 At the present, I would guess that personalities dominate the inner circle. Bashar is by far the best educated, but is quiet and reserved. Maher is not stupid, but apparently has a violent temper that is just barely controlled. We don't know much about brother-in-law Shawqat, but it does not take much to imagine that the former head of the state intelligence apparatus is strong-willed. It looks like two against one in the family board room fights.

 Bashar's Dilemma

 I would not be surprised if Bashar al-Assad to this day is deeply conflicted over his choices. He might be a true tyrant, but his background, education, professional training and chosen life trajectory before recall to Syria suggests otherwise. I think Bashar al-Assad is a liberal man caught in a Byzantine world of Syrian politics and power. He cannot escape safely because he knows too much and has compromised too much. I doubt, however, unless he is deeply self-deceptive, that he sleeps well at night. He might be fooling himself, but I think he is too intelligent to be completely self-deceptive.

 Advice from the Family Business Consultant

 The business is bankrupt. It was probably insolvent at the time Bashar took it over from his father. His reorganization plan had no chance of success because the entrenched interests could not tolerate the change. Yet, his plan was probably the only path to avoid eventual violence and civil war. Bashar has no easy way out. If he could find a way to move his family to safety, he might consider resigning. His brother Maher or brother-in-law Assef Shawqat would probably assume power, and the civil war would intensify as the insurgents saw his resignation as validation of their power. From Bashar's perspective, resignation would make matters worse, not better, for the Syrian people. He has already been labeled a war criminal for allowing his brother to brutalize civilian populations. He probably faces indictment from the ICC for war crimes and human rights abuses. Resignation would also be a betrayal of family, which is unthinkable in his culture.

 Remaining in power is not viable either. Even the normally quiescent and malleable Arab League has condemned his government and is preparing to impose stiff sanctions. Turkey has threatened to cut off Syria's electricity. Both the US and the EU are escalating economic and political sanctions. Only the objections of Russia and China prevent the Security Council from condemning the Assad regime and bringing the full force of the international community against it.

 If this were a true family business, my advice would be to sell or liquidate. The conflict will only destroy the remaining family wealth. Even if the current civil war can somehow be stopped, there is no long term upside for the Assad family. The oppression will not stop the protests and cannot contain the Sunni majority forever. The dramatically changed political environment in the Middle East no longer tolerates autocratic rule when that rule is harsh and despotic. Thus, the new business environment dictates a radical change in strategy.

  And, at the end of it all, there is the moral dilemma. How does a liberally trained opthamalogist married to an investment banker live with himself over the deaths of 4,000 civilians, clear and present inequity and injustice, and continued government sanctioned-violence perpetrated in his name?

 My advice, as a professional peacemaker, is to resign and face the consequences of past decisions. The shame of family betrayal will be great, but staying in the business will only lead to greater personal, family, and national betrayal. The Assad family business conflict doesn't seem a lot different than a lot of other family business conflicts and the outcomes are just as sad and predictable.

 

Douglas E. Noll is a lawyer turned peacemaker, professional mediator, and author of Elusive Peace: How Modern Diplomatic Strategies Could Better Resolve World Conflicts (Prometheus Books, 2011).www.elusivepeace.com