dougnoll’s posthaven

Segment 1: Rafia Zakaria.  On this edition of The Doug Noll Show we’re speaking with attorney, author and human rights advocate Rafia Zakaria. Rafia is a regular columnist for a number of publications and also serves on the Board of Amnesty International USA as the first Pakistani American woman ever to do so. 

Rafia is originally from Karachi, Pakistan, which is one of the world’s largest cities. She came to the U.S. in the late 1990’s to attend college, then law school, and ultimately did graduate work in political philosophy. Her journey was unusual in the sense that half of her life was spent in Pakistan and the other half has been in the United States. Rafia has a sense of dual consciousness having lived in two societies. She never thought her country of origin would be at war with the country in which she now lives.

Pakistan has many different ethic groups. When Rafia speaks about Pakistan to an American audience she always emphasizes its geographical location. It’s a small country encroached by big countries. To understand Pakistan’s national psyche, you have to remember that they have a hostile India on one border, Iran on another side, a third border with China, and then another border with US NATO forces. As a country, Pakistan feels threatened, which is very much felt as a child growing up there. There’s a constant shadow of war.

Segment 2: The Partition of India.  Pakistan has clearly suffered at the hands of European Imperialism. The demarcation of the border between Pakistan and India has played a huge role in their history. The Partition of India was the largest movement of humans in modern history. Millions of people moved, there were many deaths and lost families. The people who came to Pakistan had lived in their own communities for centuries. They had no reference point for what migration would feel like and how to set up new communities. On the other hand, the Pakistani people found themselves surrounded by strangers from another country. In many ways Partition defines Pakistan’s current issues and discord. 

Segment 3: Culture and Religion are Intermingled.  Pakistan’s culture and religion are intermingled as well as heavily patriarchal, which has been a constant cause of strife. The challenge that Pakistani women face is to discern what is “cultural” and what is “religious.” Women’s perspectives were often left out of religious texts, but change in this respect is often met with tremendous opposition.

Segment 4: Two Power Contenders.  The schism between Shia and Sunni doctrine is becoming a focal point in terms of politics and violence. There are two power contenders in the Middle East: Saudi Arabia and Iran. Rafia grew up with Sunni and Shia living peacefully with each other, celebrating holidays together, worshiping in the same mosques. When the U.S. pulled out of the region, there was an aid vacuum created, and the Saudies funded thousands of religious groups in Pakistan. This is turn declared Shia as Pakistan’s heritage. This is a division that has been poked and prodded and revitalized continually in the modern era by one of the biggest U.S. allies, Saudi Arabia.

To listen to the entire interview, CLICK HERE or visit http://wsradio.com/090414-rafia-zakaria-author-attorney-human-rights-activist/.

In early January 2012, the Obama administration sent a letter to the Iranian government through diplomatic channels. The letter stated the consequences of an Iranian attempt to block the Strait of Hormuz and requested direct talks. Whether Iran agrees to talk remains to be seen. Certainly, the talks will be secret and low level unless they produce tangible benefits for both sides. How would a professional mediator approach these talks as a negotiator?
Understanding the interests of both the Iranian and American perspectives is a critical first step.
The Iranian government first and foremost wants to protect its power, position, and privilege from internal and external threats. The Shia Islamic regime sees as many threats from Sunni Islam as from the West. The Bush presidency handed Iran a rare opportunity to gather power and influence in the Middle East when Bush decided to topple Iran’s primary enemy, Sadaam Hussein. Since the overthrow of Hussein and his Baathist regime, Iran has increased its influence in Iraq through its support of the Iraqi Shia. Iran has an interest in preserving and increasing its influence over Iraqi politics. Likewise, Iran wishes to see the al Assad regime retain its power in Syria. Iran also wants to avoid a situation in which the United States, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, among others, decide to bring down the al Assad regime. To the east, Iran wishes to exert influence in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which are bordering countries.
In summary, the Iranian interests are regime preservation, increased political and economic influence in the region, and continued support of Shia Islamists. It does not want a war with the West.
American interests are likewise straightforward. America does not want oil supplies disrupted; it does not want failed states in the region to be sanctuaries for terrorists; it does not want a war with Iran; it does not want Islamic sectarian strife to widen or intensify; it wants stable political and economic regimes in oil producing countries; it would like to see governments in the region respect human rights more consistently; it would like to see Iran abandon nuclear weapons development. The US is or soon will be discussing peace with various Taliban elements as a prelude to exiting Afghanistan. Iran has levers it can pull in Afghanistan and Pakistan that could block those discussions. The US therefore does not want Iranian interference in talks with the Taliban.
Political realities will also influence these conversations. The initial representatives of both countries will not be high level policy makers. They will each have limited authority to make concessions and no authority to make binding agreements. Their conduct will be scrutinized by opposition elements in each country and subject to severe criticism. Thus, the early conversations will be conservative, confirmatory, and exploratory. They will be conservative because the domestic political realities will not permit a radical shift in the strategic relationship between Iran and America. They will be confirmatory as each side assesses whether their working hypotheses of each other’s interests are correct. They will be exploratory as each side tests for potential gains from continued discussions.
Negotiation style, modulated by culture, will also be an important element of preparation. The Iranians may at times demonstrate aggressive, threatening negotiating behaviors. The Iranian government wants to be respected and feared, internally and externally. National pride is significant, bringing the psychology of identity into the negotiation. American negotiators may be more linear and bottom line oriented. The negotiations might be something like rug merchant meets used car salesman. Frustration over negotiating styles should be anticipated. Preparing for a conflict in negotiation customs, methods, and styles will therefore be important.
Trust and accountability will also be an issue requiring preparation. When the value of what is being negotiated is well known and the exchange mechanisms are well-established, successful negotiations can occur with very little trust. In this negotiation there will be no easily determined valuation of interests and certainly no agreed upon exchange mechanism. Thus, trust becomes a central issue. How will each side assure itself that the other side will abide by agreements?
Similarly, the talks will have to occur secretly. However, one side or the other might see an opportunity to exploit the situation by talking to the media. Maintaining confidentiality will be a challenge.
This is a situation that calls for preparation, analysis, and role play rehearsal. The US representatives would be well-served to practice in simulated negotiation sessions that explore all of the challenges and roadblocks that might be anticipated with the Iranians. They should master a number of different negotiation processes including integrative as well as distributive processes. They should be psychologically prepared for any number of possible behaviors and have counter-tactics for each. They should be skilled at listening for what is being said and for paying close attention to what is not being said. Likewise, they should pay close attention to what they say, how they say it, and what they do not say.
These will not be mediated conversations. US-Iranian back-channel negotiations have a poor track record so there is no reason for optimism. However, conversations of any kind are better than silence and certainly better than war. The US can improve the chances of success by careful and thorough preparation of its representatives.